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Abstract
The ﬁnancial crisis clearly illuminated the potential amplifying role of ﬁnancial factors on macroe-
conomic developments. Indeed, the heavy impairments of banks’ balance sheets brought to the fore
the banking sector’s ability to provide a smooth ﬂow of credit to the real economy. However, most ex-
isting structural macroeconomic models fail to take into account the crucial roleof banks’ balance sheet
adjustment in the propagation of shocks to the economy. This paper contributes to ﬁll this gap, analyz-
ing the roleof creditmarket frictions in business cycle ﬂuctuations and in the transmission of monetary
policy. We estimate a closed-economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for the
euro area with ﬁnancially-constrained households and ﬁrms and embedding an oligopolistic banking
sector facing capital constraints. Using this setup we examine the macroeconomic implications of var-
ious ﬁnancial frictions on the supply and demand of credit, and in particular we assess the effects of
introducing risk-sensitive and more stringent capital requirements. Finally, we explore the scope for
counter-cyclical bank capital rulesand the strategiccomplementarities between macro-prudential tools
and monetary policy.
Keywords: DSGE models, Bayesian estimation, Banking, Financial regulation.
JEL classiﬁcation: E4, E5, F4.5
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1 Non-technical summary
This paper analyzes the role of credit market frictions in business cycle ﬂuctuations and in the trans-
mission of monetary policy. We estimate a closed-economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model for the euro area with ﬁnancially-constrained households and ﬁrms and embedding an
oligopolistic banking sector facing capital constraints. Using this setup we examine the monetary policy
implications of the various ﬁnancial frictions to credit supply and demand and furthermore examine the
real economic implications of increasing capital requirements and of introducing risk-sensitive capital
requirements. Moreover, the potential for introducing counter-cyclical bank capital rules and aligning
macro-prudential tools with standard monetary policy tools is examined.
The ﬁnancial crisis which started in 2007 brought to the fore the importance of the ﬁnancial sector and
its potential amplifying effects on business cycle ﬂuctuations. The massive write-downs and losses that
banks had to incur over this period signiﬁcantly impaired their liquidity and capital positions, which
in turn forced many banks to cut back on activities and to shed assets. This deleveraging process in the
banking sector may have hampered the access to ﬁnancing for some bank-dependent borrowers and
thereby reduced their ability to consume and invest, potentially reinforcing the economic downturn.
Whereas in the macroeconomic literature it has long been recognized that ﬁnancial intermediation may
play a role in economic ﬂuctuations through the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism relating to the banks’
borrowers, the possible amplifying impact on the business cycle of shocks directly hitting the ﬁnancial
intermediaries has only recently been taken up by the literature.
The importance of the banks’ balance sheet situation in transmitting shocks to monetary policy (and
other types of shocks) has, however, long been recognized in the empirical literature. For example,
it has been pointed out that more liquid and well-capitalized banks are better able to absorb shocks
hitting the macroeconomic environment (including changes in monetary policy) than more capital and
liquidity-constrained banks. Furthermore,the ﬁnancial crisis has reinforcedinterest inmacro-prudential
tools and policies that might be applied by policy makers to reduce the risks of ﬁnancial boom and bust
cycles and thereby lead to a more stable path of real economic growth.
In addition to the attention on the role of ﬁnancial intermediaries brought forward by the ﬁnancial
crisis, the introduction of more risk-sensitive capital requirements (i.e. the Basel II capital adequacy
framework; see BCBS [2006]) has reinforced the concerns that ﬁnancial intermediation by itself might
have substantial feedback effects on the real economy. In particular, it has been argued that by introduc-
ing capital requirements that are sensitive to the state of the economy, the inherent cyclicality in banks’
lending behaviour is likely to be reinforced. Hence, as bank capital requirements will be less strict when
risks are perceived to be benign and, vice versa, will be tighter when the quality of the assets is dete-
riorating, banks are likely to engage in riskier lending during economic upturns and to contract credit
supply during economic downturns. To the extent that some ﬁrms and households are dependent on
having access to bank ﬁnancing in their investment and spending decisions, more cyclical capital re-
quirements would be expected to reinforce the propagation mechanism between the ﬁnancial system
and the real economy. In other words, ceteris paribus, a risk-sensitive capital requirements regime is
expected to have pro-cyclical effects. It has, however, been argued that by inducing a more forward-
looking behaviour in banks’ risk-taking, a risk-sensitive capital adequacy framework may also include
some mitigating elements with respect to its overall pro-cyclical effects. While the extent to which a6
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risk-sensitive capital adequacy framework introduces amplifying pro-cyclical effects is ultimately an
empirical question, the analysis of such effects needs to be placed in a broader context whereby the
feedback mechanism between the ﬁnancial and the real sector as well as the forward-looking, strategic
behaviour of ﬁnancial intermediaries are properly taken into account. In other words, a general equi-
librium framework is needed to appropriately account for the interlinkages between ﬁnancial and real
economic factors. Moreover, as a consequence of the ﬁnancial crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS) has already proposed amendments to the bank regulatory framework (i.e. Basel
III) with the aim of strengthening capital requirements. Our model is also well-suited for analyzing the
potential costs (and beneﬁts) of moving towards higher capital ratio targets and the role of monetary
policy during such a transition. Finally, a general equilibrium framework is also useful for analyzing
the potential for macro-prudential tools and their interaction with other macroeconomic and monetary
policy instruments.
Using our model setup we document the role of ﬁnancial frictions in amplifying shocks to the econ-
omy. For example, via the collateral channel housing-speciﬁc shocks generate sizeable effects on non-
residential consumption and investment. Moreover, it is shown that the speciﬁcation where borrowing
constraints arealwaysbinding producesmore pronouncedpropagationthan benchmarkmodel with en-
dogenous defaults. Furthermore, capital constraints and costs related to capital adjustments are shown
to amplify the macroeconomic propagation of exogenous shocks. In addition, it is shown that risk-
sensitive capital requirements imply marginally more volatility in the economy than a ﬁxed-rate capital
requirement regime. However, the degree of macroeconomic volatility varies with types of shocks, with
especially risk shocks and ﬁnancial shocks are found to have amplifying impact when capital require-
ments are risk sensitive. At the same time, banks are found to actively reshufﬂe their portfolios when
faced with credit risk shocks which somewhat mitigates the pro-cyclical implications. As regards the
introduction of more stringent capitalrequirements (as proposedunder Basel III),we show that it would
lead to a transitory negative impact on output. The costs related to introducing the new capital require-
ments are, however, reduced the later the implementation date and may furthermore be mitigated by
monetary policy accommodation. Finally, we illustrate the potentially complementary roles of mone-
tary macro-prudential policies in supporting macroeconomic stabilisation, but also emphasize that the
design and magnitude of macro-prudential policy rules and its interaction with monetary policy need
careful consideration.7
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2 Introduction
This paper analyzes the role of credit market frictions in business cycle ﬂuctuations and in the trans-
mission of monetary policy. We estimate a closed-economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model for the euro area with ﬁnancially constrained households and ﬁrms and embedding an
oligopolistic banking sector facing capital constraints. Using this setup we examine the monetary policy
implications of the various ﬁnancial frictions to credit supply and demand and furthermore examine the
real economic implications of increasing capital requirements and of introducing risk-sensitive capital
requirements. Moreover, the potential for introducing counter-cyclical bank capital rules and aligning
macro-prudential tools with standard monetary policy tools is examined.
The ﬁnancial crisis which started in 2007 brought to the fore the importance of the ﬁnancial sector and
its potential amplifying effects on business cycle ﬂuctuations. The massive write-downs and losses that
banks had to incur over this period signiﬁcantly impaired their liquidity and capital positions, which
in turn forced many banks to cut back on activities and to shed assets. This deleveraging process in the
banking sector may have hampered the access to ﬁnancing for some bank-dependent borrowers and
thereby reduced their ability to consume and invest, potentially reinforcing the economic downturn.
Whereas in the macroeconomic literature it has long been recognized that ﬁnancial intermediation may
play a role in economic ﬂuctuations through the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism relating to the banks’
borrowers 1, the possible amplifying impact on the business cycle of shocks directly hitting the ﬁnancial
intermediaries has only recently been taken up by the literature. 2 The importance of the banks’ balance
sheet situation in transmitting shocks to monetary policy (and other types of shocks) has, however, long
been recognized in the empirical literature. For example, it has been pointed out that more liquid and
well-capitalized banks are better able to absorb shocks hitting the macroeconomic environment (includ-
ing changes in monetary policy) than more capital and liquidity-constrained banks. 3 Furthermore, the
ﬁnancial crisis has reinforced interest in macroprudential tools and policies that might be applied by
policy makers to reduce the risks of ﬁnancial boom and bust cycles and thereby lead to a more stable
path of real economic growth.
In addition to the attention on the role of ﬁnancial intermediaries brought forward by the ﬁnancial
crisis, the introduction of more risk-sensitive capital requirements (i.e. the Basel II capital adequacy
framework; see BCBS [2006]) has reinforced the concerns that ﬁnancial intermediation by itself might
have substantial feedback effects on the real economy. In particular, it has been argued that by introduc-
ing capital requirements that are sensitive to the state of the economy, the inherent cyclicality in banks’
lending behaviour is likely to be reinforced. Hence, as bank capital requirements will be less strict when
1Financing frictions arising in the context of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders are often suggested as a
primecandidate for endogenouslyamplifying and increasing thepersistence of evensmall transitory exogenous shocks. Thebasic
idea, often called the ﬁnancial accelerator, is that in the presence of credit constraints exogenous shocks can generate a positive
feedback effect between the ﬁnancial health of borrowing ﬁrms or households and output; See e.g. Carlstrom and Fuerst [1997],
Kiyotaki and Moore [1997]a n dBernanke et al. [1999] (BGG hereafter). Recent work by Christiano et al. [2007], Christensen and
Dib [2008]a n dLiu et al. [2009] quantiﬁes the interlinkages between the ﬁnancial and real sectors using a ﬁnancial accelerator
mechanism.
2For some recent studies modelling the banking sector in a DSGE modelling framework, see e.g. Van den Heuvel [2008], Meh
and Moren [2008], De Walque et al. [2009], Dib [2009], Gerali et al. [2009], Aguiar and Drumond [2009], Agenor and Pereira da
Silva [2009], Agenor andAlper [2009], Gertlerand Karadi [2009], Covas and Fujita [2009], Angeloni and Faia [2009]a n dChristiano
et al. [2010].
3Seee.g. BernankeandLown [1991], PeekandRosengren[1995], Kashyapand Stein[2000], VandenHeuvel[2002], Gambacorta
and Mistrulli [2004], and Kishan and Opiela [2006].8
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risks are perceived to be benign and, vice versa, will be tighter when the quality of the assets is dete-
riorating, banks are likely to engage in riskier lending during economic upturns and to contract credit
supply during economic downturns. To the extent that some ﬁrms and households are dependent on
having access to bank ﬁnancing in their investment and spending decisions, more cyclical capital re-
quirements would be expected to reinforce the propagation mechanism between the ﬁnancial system
and the real economy. In other words, ceteris paribus, a risk-sensitive capital requirements regime is
expected to have pro-cyclical effects. 4 It has, however, been argued that by inducing a more forward-
looking behaviour in banks’ risk-taking, a risk-sensitive capital adequacy framework may also include
some mitigating elements with respect to its overall pro-cyclical effects. 5 While the extent to which
a risk-sensitive capital adequacy framework introduces amplifying pro-cyclical effects is ultimately an
empirical question, the analysis of such effects needs to be placed in a broader context whereby the
feedback mechanism between the ﬁnancial and the real sector as well as the forward-looking, strategic
behaviour of ﬁnancial intermediaries are properly taken into account. In other words, a general equi-
librium framework is needed to appropriately account for the interlinkages between ﬁnancial and real
economic factors. Moreover, as a consequence of the ﬁnancial crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS) has already proposed amendments to the bank regulatory framework (i.e. Basel III)
with the aim of strengthening capital requirements.6 Our model is also well-suited for analyzing the
potential costs (and beneﬁts) of moving towards higher capital ratio targets and the role of monetary
policy during such a transition. Finally, a general equilibrium framework is also useful for analyzing
the potential for macro-prudential tools and their interaction with other macroeconomic and monetary
policy instruments.
Against this background, in this paper we propose a closed-economy DSGE model with ﬁnancial fric-
tions including a banking sector which faces monopolistic competition and is subject to capital con-
straints. The latter may owe both to market disciplining forces (i.e. banks operate with a capital buffer)
and to regulatory capital adequacy rules (which can be either risk-insensitive or risk-sensitive). Fur-
thermore, the presence of monopolistic competition in the banking sector gives rise to some degree of
stickiness in banks’ adjustment of lending and deposit rates to changes in monetary policy rates. From
a theoretical viewpoint a sluggish pass-through of bank loan and deposit rates to policy rate changes
is based on the notion of banks having some degree of market power, which may derive from banks
being "special" in the sense of being able to reduce (by acting as "delegated monitors") the information
gap between savers and borrowers of funds.7 In general, banks’ interest rate setting behaviour can be
expected to depend on the degree of bank competition (or market power of banks) and on factors re-
lated to the costs of ﬁnancial intermediation (such as interest rate and credit risk, menu costs and other
operational costs, banks’ degree of risk aversion and the cost of non-deposit funding sources).8 Hence,
by exploiting their market power banks are able to generate proﬁts and thus to replenish their capital
4On the procyclicality of risk-sensitive requirements, see e.g. Danielsson et al. [2001], Catarineau-Rabell et al. [2005], Kashyap
and Stein [2004], Gordy and Howells [2006], and Brunnermeier et al. [2009]. See also Drumond [2008] for an overview of the
literature.
5See e.g. Borio and Zhu [2008], Zhu [2008], Repullo and Suarez [2009], Jokivuolle et al. [2009], and Boissay and Kok Sørensen
[2009].
6See BCBS (2009), "Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector - consultative document", December and BCBS (2010),
"The Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision announces higher global minimum capital standards", September.
7see e.g. Diamond and Dybvig [1983], Diamond [1984]a n dDiamond and Rajan [2001].
8There is ample empirical evidence for the existence of a sluggish bank interest rate pass-through in the euro area (see e.g.
Mojon [2001], De Bondt [2005], Sander and Kleimeier [2006], Kok Sørensen and Werner [2006]a n dGropp et al. [2007].9
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buffers following shocks to their liquidity and capital positions.9 Under risk-sensitive capital require-
ments banks’ capital positions are affected by changes in the risk proﬁle of their borrowers over the
business cycle and the time-varying nature of bank borrower risk proﬁles is therefore also considered in
our modelling of ﬁrms and households.
On the real side of the economy we assume that households and ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained in
their spending and investment decisions and we furthermore incorporate some degree of heterogeneity
in the household sector. The model has a subset of ﬁrms that are ﬁnancially constrained and can only
borrow by using revenue and capital as collateral, and a subset of ﬁnancially-constrained households
that use debt collateralized by housing and part of their wage income. Both ﬁrms and households
are affected by idiosyncratic shocks to their collateral values. Firms and households default on their
loans when the value of their collateral is below the repayment promised to the lender. In order to
keep the model tractable we follow other DSGE models of ﬁnancial frictions in using differences in the
level of impatience of agents to generate equilibrium borrowing and lending (e.g. Iacoviello [2005]).
In equilibrium, more impatient agents (borrowers and entrepreneurs) will borrow from patient savers.
We assume that borrowers of each type (households and ﬁrms) belong to a large family, as in Shi [1997].
While this allows them to diversify their idiosyncratic risk eachperiod afterall debt contracts aresettled,
they cannot commit to sharing the proceeds of this insurance with the banks and hence the latter cannot
seize the proceeds of the insurance payments when the borrower defaults. The combination of the
large family insurance and limited liability allows us to partially preserve the effects of risk averse,
consumption-smoothing behaviour of agents despite the ex-ante heterogeneity among agents and the
nonlinear default decision.
More speciﬁcally, as regards the household sector, we follow a recent strand of literature which - like
Kiyotaki and Moore [1997] - considers a dual structure, with agents belonging to two different groups
according to their intertemporal discount factor. Households’ heterogeneity generates equilibrium debt
as the result of intertemporal borrowing between more and less impatient agents. Building on Iacoviello
andNeri[2009]andNotarpietro[2007],we deﬁnea two-agent, two-sector economy, wherethe impatient
agents face collateral requirements when asking for mortgages or loans. Firms producenondurable con-
sumption goods and residential goods. The latter serve two purposes: they can be directly consumed,
thus providing utility services as any durablegood, or they can be used as collateralin the creditmarket,
to obtain extra funds for ﬁnancing consumption. The role of collateral constraints in closed economies
has been estimated in DSGE models by Iacoviello and Neri [2009]a n dNotarpietro [2007], who report
the relevance of housing market shocks in shaping consumption dynamics in the US. Most existing
models of household borrowing in a DSGE framework follow Iacoviello [2005]an dKiyotaki and Moore
[1997] in using a hard borrowing constraint and assuming it always binds. The Kiyotaki-Moore model
of credit constraints can be seen as a special case of the current model in which there is no uncertainty
about the future value of the collateral when the loan is made. The assumption that the constraint al-
ways binds makes the leverage ratio in their model constant. Furthermore, they ignore any difference
between borrowing rates and the risk free rate. The model proposed here can at least qualitatively
match the typically observed countercyclical leverage ratio of households10 The assumption of an al-
9There are a few recent studies that embed features of an incomplete bank interest rate pass-through into a DSGE model
framework, see e.g. Kobayashi [2008], Agenor and Alper [2009], Hülsewig et al. [2009]a n dGerali et al. [2009].
10For instance, as found for the US by Adrian and Shin [2009].10
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ways binding borrowing constraint is questionable for large shocks that may be of particular interest
to policymakers, and it may severely distort the dynamics of borrowers and the rest of the economy in
those circumstances. The soft borrowing constraint in our model (with interest rates rising smoothly as
a function of borrowing) will always bind as long as it can be satisﬁed.
For what concerns the non-ﬁnancial corporate sector we broadly follow Bernanke et al. [1999]a n dCarl-
strom and Fuerst [1997] who introduced equilibrium default of ﬁrms into DSGE models. To facilitate
aggregation, they assumed risk-neutral entrepreneurs, and constant-returns-to-scale production. Using
a setup with equilibrium default, as in those earlier models, allows us to examine the impact of time-
varying interest rate spreadsand leverage ratios. At the same time, in contrast to the previous literature,
we consider a more standard formulation of entrepreneur balance sheets than the less conventional bal-
ance sheet used by BGG. In particular, in our setup entrepreneurs own their capital stock, as in more
sophisticated heterogeneous agent models of ﬁnancing constraints, and do not have to repurchase it
or rent it each period as in BGG or Carlstrom and Fuerst [1997]. Furthermore, entrepreneurs are risk
averse and make a meaningful consumption-saving choice. In contrast, BGG assume an exogenously
ﬁxed constant savings rate for entrepreneurs, while Carlstrom and Fuerst [1997] assume that they are
risk neutral. Finally, our speciﬁcation of the non-ﬁnancial corporatesector allows considering other non-
linearities in the budget constraint of ﬁnancially-constrained entrepreneurs, such as decreasing returns
to scale, imperfect competition or labor adjustment costs.
The only other papers that have allowed for ﬁnancing frictions affecting both households and ﬁrms are
Iacoviello [2005]a n dGerali et al. [2009]. Both of these papers rely on hard borrowing constraints, as in
Kiyotaki and Moore [1997],to model credit frictions and assume the borrowing constraints always bind.
Our model setup provides an alternative perspective by including costs of default and positive lending
spreads.
By allowing for frictions concerning both credit demand and supply, the contributions of this paper
cover several dimensions. First, we examine to what extent such frictions amplify shocks to the econ-
omy and how they affect the monetary policy transmission mechanism. Apart from encompassing the
traditional ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism arising in the context of ﬁnancially-constrained borrowers,
our model allows for assessing the impact of frictions within the banking sector, such as its price-setting
behavior and constraints to its capital management. In particular, we assess the extent to which the
presence of bank loan and deposit rate sluggishness affect monetary policy optimization. Moreover,
our setup allows for examining the macroeconomic implications of shocks to bank capital (as those
observed during the 2007-10 ﬁnancial crisis as well as reﬂected in the proposal to introduce stronger
capital requirements under the Basel III agreement) and the implications of introducing risk-sensitive
capital requirements or the transitional effects of higher capital requirements. Furthermore, our model
can also shed some light on the potential effects of active macro-prudential policies over the cycle and
their interaction with monetary policy.
At the same time, our current model setup is less suited for analyzing the issues of liquidity and whole-
sale funding vulnerabilities, which arguably were other main contributing factors to the severity and
propagation of the ﬁnancial crisis. The macroeconomic implications of money market disruptions and
the potential role of unconventional monetary policies have been addressed in other recent papers (see
e.g. Gertler and Kiyotaki [2009]a n da l s oChristiano et al. [2010])
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the main decision problems of the11
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structural model. Section 3 presents the results of the Bayesian estimation. Section 4 explores in turn
the propagation of housing-related and productivity shocks in the estimated model. Furthermore, the
business cycle implications of the imperfect bank interest rate pass-through and bank capital constraints
are highlighted. In section 5 we investigate the optimal monetary policy responses under different
regulatory frameworks focusing in particular on the introduction of risk-based capital requirements
and macro-prudential rules. Section 6 concludes.
3 Theoretical model
Theeconomy ismodeledasathree-agent,two-sectoreconomy, producingresidentialandnon-residential
goods. Residential goods are treated here as durable goods. A continuum of entrepreneurs, with unit
mass, produce non-residential and residential intermediate goods under perfect competition and face
ﬁnancing constraints. Then retailers differentiate the intermediate goods under imperfect competition
and staggered price setting, while competitive distribution sectors serve ﬁnal non-residential consump-
tion as well as residential and non-residential investments. A continuum of inﬁnitely-lived households,
with unit mass, is composed of two types, differing in their relative intertemporal discount factor. A
fraction (1 − ω) of households are relatively patient, the remaining fraction ω being impatient.H o u s e -
holds receive utility from consuming both non-residential and residential goods, and disutility from
labor. Impatient households are ﬁnancially constrained.
The banking sector collects deposit from patient households and provides funds to entrepreneurs and
impatient households. Three layers of frictions affect ﬁnancial intermediaries. First, wholesales banking
branches face capital requirements (which can be risk-insensitive or risk-sensitive) as well as adjust-
ment costs related to their capital structure. Second, some degree of nominal stickiness generates some
imperfect pass-through of market rates to bank deposit and lending rates. Finally, due to asymmetric
information and monitoring cost in the presence of idiosyncratic shocks, the credit contracts proposed
to entrepreneurs and impatient households factor in external ﬁnancing premia which depend indirectly
on the borrower’s leverage.
3.1 Households
3.1.1 The saver’s program
The patient agents, s ∈ [ω,1], are characterized by a higher intertemporal discount factor than the bor-
rowers, and thus act as net lenders in equilibrium. They own the productive capacities of the economy.
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withtheparameterhS capturinghabitformationin consumption of non-residentialgoods. We introduce
three stochastic terms in the utility function: a preference shock ε
β
t , a labor supply shock εL
t (common
across sectors) and a housing preference shock, εD
t . The latter affects the relative share of residential
stock, ωD, and modiﬁes the marginal rate of substitution between non-residential and residential goods
consumption. All the shocks are assumed to follow stationary AR(1) processes.
Households receive disutility from their supply of homogenous labor services to each sector, Ns
C,t and
Ns
D,t. The realcompensation of hours worked in eachsector aredenoted ws
C,t andws
D,t. The speciﬁcation
of labor supply assumes that households have preferencesover providing labor services across different
sectors. In particular, the speciﬁc functional form adopted implies that hours worked are perfectly
substitutable across sectors. LC and LD are level-shift terms needed to ensure that the patient’s labor
supply is equal to one in steady state.


























whereQD,tTD,t is realprice of housing stock in terms of non-residential goods, TTs
t arerealgovernment
transfers and Πs
t are real distributed proﬁts. δ ∈ (0,1) is the residential good depreciation rate. πt is
the non-residential good inﬂation rate. RD,t−1 is the nominal interest rate paid on the one-period real
deposits Deps
t.
In equilibrium, all savers have identical consumption plans. Therefore, we can drop superscripts s.W e






The optimality conditions characterizing the solution of the saver’s problem are reported in the Ap-
pendix.
3.1.2 The borrower’s program
Each impatient agent b ∈ [0,ω] receives utility from the same type of function as in the case of patient
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As regards savers, LB,C and LB,D are level-shift terms needed to ensure that the impatient’s labor sup-
ply equals one in steady state.
11Variables related to the saver are denoted with a superscript b, as opposed to s, used for the savers.13
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Borrowers’ incomes and housing stock values are subject to common idiosyncratic shocks  HH,t that
are i.i.d across borrowers and across time.  HH,t has a lognormal CDF F( ) with F  ( )=f( ), and
am e a no fE( )=1 . The variance of the idiosyncratic shock σHH,t is time-varying. The value of the
borrower’s house is given by
 HH,t   QD,tTD,t(1 − δ)   Db
t−1.
Lending in this economy is only possible through 1-period state-contingent debt contracts that require
a constant repayment of (1+R
L
HH,t)
1+πt BHH,t−1 independent of  HH,t if the borrower is to avoid costly loan
monitoring or enforcement, where RL
HH,t is the nominal lending rate.
The borrower can default and refuse to repay the debt. Savers cannot force borrowers to repay. Instead
lending must be intermediated by commercial banks that have a loan enforcement technology allowing
them to seize collateral expressed in real terms
 HH,t ˜ Ab
HH,t =( 1− χHH) HH,t   QD,tTD,t(1 − δ)   Db
t−1
at a proportional cost μHH HH,t ˜ AHH,t when the borrower defaults.
μHH ∈ (0,1) determines the deadweight cost of default, 0 <χ HH ≤ 1 represents housing exemptions.
It deﬁnes the maximum loan to collateral ratio (often called the Loan-to-Value Ratio) that the bank is
willing to grant against each component of the collateral . Conditional on enforcement, the law cannot
prevent the bank from seizing  HH,t ˜ AHH,t. Suppose ﬁrst that the borrower does not have access to any
insurance against the  HH,t shock. Whenever  HH,t <  HH,t the borrower prefers to default and lose







BHH,t−1 =  HH,t ˜ Ab
HH,t








To be able to use a representative agent framework while maintaining the intuition of the default rule
above, we assume that borrowers belong to a large family that can pool their assets and diversify away
the risk related to  HH,t after loan repayments are made. As in Lucas [1990]a n dShi [1997], The family
maximizes the expected lifetime utility of borrowers with an equal welfare weight for each borrower.
The payments from the insurance scheme cannot be seized by the bank. As a result, despite the in-
surance the bank cannot force the borrower to repay (1+R
L
HH,t)
1+πt BHH,t−1 when  HH,t <  HH,t. Like
the individual borrowers, the family cannot commit to always repay the loan (or make up for any lack
of payment by a borrower), even though from an ex-ante perspective it is optimal to do so. Ex-post,
from the perspective of maximizing the expected welfare of the borrowers, for any given RL
HH,t it is





Given the large family assumption in particular, households decisions are the same in equilibrium.
Therefore, we can drop the superscript b.
By pooling the borrowers’ resources, the representative family has the following aggregate repayments
and defaults on its outstanding loan:
H( HH,t) ˜ AHH,t =[ ( 1− Ft( HH,t)) HH,t +
   HH,t
0
 dFt] ˜ AHH,t.14
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On the commercial lending bank side, the proﬁt made on the credit allocation is given by





G( HH,t)=( 1− Ft( HH,t)) HH,t +( 1− μHH)
   HH,t
0
 dFt
RHH,t−1 is the interest rate at which the commercial lending bank gets ﬁnancing every period while
RL
HH,t is the state-contingent lending rate. Competition among banks will ensure that proﬁts are null
in equilibrium. The zero proﬁt condition could also be seen as the borrowing constraint in this model.
Notice that this constraint always binds as long as it can be satisﬁed.12 In contrast, the hard borrowing
constraint in Kiyotaki and Moore [1997]o rIacoviello [2005] may not bind, even though authors using
that framework assume it always binds to allow the use of perturbation methods.13 The caveat, is that
if a new shock signiﬁcantly lowers the value of ˜ AHH,t it may be impossible to ﬁnd a default threshold
that allows the bank to break even on the loan with the risk free rate. This should not be a major concern
except for very low aggregate shock values.14
With the assumption of perfectlycompetitivebanks we canrepresenttheproblemofborrowersasif they
choose defaultthresholds as a function of the aggregatestates directly,subject to the bank’s participation
constraints.
Each borrower maximizes utility function with respect to (   Ct,   Dt,B HH,t HH,t,N C,t,N D,t) subject to an
inﬁnite sequence of real budget constraints15:
  Ct +   QD,tTD,t
 
  Dt − (1 − δ)   Dt−1
 
+ H( HH,t) ˜ AHH,t = BHH,t +   TTt
+  wC,t   NC,t +   wD,t   ND,t
and the zero proﬁt condition for the commercial lending banks.
We report the ﬁrst order conditions for this problem in the Appendix.
3.2 Labor supply and wage setting
The labor market structure is modeled following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2006]. In both countries,
households of each type (patient, impatient) provide homogeneous labor services, which are trans-
formed by monopolistically competitive unions into differentiated labor inputs. As a result, all house-
hold of the same type supply the same amount of hours worked in each sector, in equilibrium.
We assume that in each sector j ∈{ C,D} there exist monopolistically competitive labor unions indexed
representing the patient and impatient households. Unions differentiate the homogeneous labor pro-
vided by households, Njt from savers and   Njt from borrowers, creating a continuum of measure one of
labor services (indexed by z ∈ [0,1]) which are sold to labor packers.
12If the constraint were slack, the lender could always reduce the borrower’s expected repayments while still respecting the
constraint by reducing  HH,t
13This may be a reasonable assumption for small shocks, but it can be a bad approximation for larger shocks that may be of
concern to policymakers.
14In our calibrations, the balanced growth path value of the Loan to Value ratio (LTV) G( HH,t) is around 0.5. This suggests
that we would need shocks that cause extremely large movementsin the LTV on impact before we violate the upper bound on the
LTV. See the appendix in Bernanke et al. [1999] for a discussion of the same issue in their model.
15We use the non-residential goods price level as a deﬂator.15
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Then perfectly competitive labor packers buy the differentiatedlabor input and aggregatethem through
a CES technology into one labor input per sector and households type. Finally the labor inputs are
further combined using a Cobb-Douglas technology to produce the aggregate labor resource LC,t and
L D,t that enter the production functions of entrepreneurs (see later). We specify the details of the labor
packers proﬁt-maximization problem below.
For i ∈{ B,S}, Lj,i,t measures aggregate labor input for household type i and sector j,
Lj,i,t =






while Wj,i,t denotes the aggregate nominal wage for type i and sector j :
Wj,i,t =















where z ∈ [0,1],μ w = θw
θw−1 and θw > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated labor
services, which we assume to be constant across types and sectors. Clearly, our structure gives rise to
four different wages in equilibrium, each corresponding to a speciﬁc worker type (patient, impatient) in
a speciﬁc sector (C,D). Unions set wages on a staggeredbasis. Everyperiod, each union facesa constant
probability 1 − αwji of being able to adjust its nominal wage. If the union is not allowed to re-optimize,
wages are indexed to past and steady-state inﬂation according to the following rule:








where Πt = Pt
Pt−1 and γj,i
w denotes the degree of indexation in each sector, for each type. Taking into
account that unions might not be able to choose their nominal wage optimally in the future, the optimal
nominal wage   Wj,i,t(z) is chosen to maximize intertemporal utility under the budget constraint and the
labor demand function. The Appendix reports the ﬁrst order conditions for this program written in a
recursive form, and an expression for the aggregate wage dynamics.
Market clearing conditions between household supply of homogenous labor services and unions differ-
entiated labor input imply for j ∈{ C,D}:
ω   Nj,t ≡
  1
0
L j,B,t(z)dz =Δ w
j,B,tL j,B,t
and
(1 − ω)Nj,t ≡
  1
0
L j,S,t(z)dz =Δ w
j,S,tL j,S,t
T h eﬁ n a la g g r e g a t eb yl a b o rp a c k e r su s e saC o b b - Douglas production function as follows:
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j,i,t denotes wage dispersion in sector j, related to agent i. Notice that wage dispersion is
inefﬁcient, as all job varieties are ex-ante identical 16.
3.3 Non-ﬁnancial corporate sectors
3.3.1 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs are also more impatient than household savers and have a discount factor βE <β .T h e y
receive utility from their consumption of non-residential goods. They are in charge of the production of
intermediate residential and non-residential goods, and operate in a perfectly competitive environment.






















Non-residential intermediate goods are produced with capital and labor while residential intermediate
goods combine capital,laborand land. In everyperiodof time, saversareendowedwith agivenamount
of land, which they sell to the entrepreneurs in a ﬁxed quantity. We assume that the supply of land is
exogenously ﬁxed and that each entrepreneur takes the price of land as given in its decision problem.


























t are an exogenous technology shocks and Lt(e) denotes the endowment of land used
by entrepreneur e at time t. Capital is sector speciﬁc and is augmented by a variable capacity utiliza-
tion rate ut.MC t and MCD,t denote the selling prices for intermediate non-residential and residential
products.
Entrepreneurs’ ﬁxed capital are subject to common multiplicative idiosyncratic shocks  E,t.A s f o r
households, theseshocks areindependentandidenticallydistributedacrosstimeandacrossentrepreneurs
with E( E,t)=1 , and a lognormal CDF FE( E,t). Here again, the variance of the idiosyncratic shock
σE,t is time-varying.
As for borrowers, entrepreneurs only use debt contracts in which the loan rates can be made contingent
on aggregate shocks but not on the idiosyncratic shock  E,t. Entrepreneurs belong to a large family
that can diversify the idiosyncratic risk after loan contracts are settled, but cannot commit to sharing
16see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2006]17
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the proceeds of this insurance with banks. Banks can seize collateral  E,t ˜ AE,t when the entrepreneur
refuses to pay at a cost of μE E,t ˜ AE,t. The value of the collateral that the bank can seize is





We assume that the capital utilization rate is predetermined with respect to the idiosyncratic shock to
facilitate aggregation. χE reﬂect the ability to collateralize capital This speciﬁcation relates to models
where only capital serves as collateral as in Gerali et al. [2009]o rKobayashi et al. [2007].
Aggregate repayments or defaults on outstanding loan to entrepreneurs are:
HE( E,t) ˜ AE,t =[ ( 1− FE
t ( E,t)) E,t +
   E,t
0
 dFE
t ] ˜ AE,t.
On the commercial lending bank side, the proﬁt made on the credit allocation is given by
G






E( E,t)=( 1− F
E
t ( E,t)) E,t +( 1− μE)





RE,t−1 is the interest rate at which the commercial lending bank gets ﬁnancing every period while RL
E,t












t − (1 − δK)KC
t−1)+QD
t (KD
t − (1 − δK)KD
t−1)+HE( E,t) ˜ AE,t



















togetherwiththe participationconstraints forthebanks.Weassumethe followingfunctionalformforthe












and Wouters [2007], the cost of capacity utilization is zero when capacity is fully used (Φ(1) = 0). plt
denotes the relative price of land deﬂated by non-residential goods price.
We report the ﬁrst order conditions for this problem in the Appendix.
3.3.2 Retailers and distribution sectors
Retailers differentiate the residential and non-residential goods produced by the entrepreneurs and op-
erate under monopolistic competition. They sell their output to the perfectly competitive distribution
sectors which aggregatethe continuum of differentiatedgoods. The elementary differentiatedgoods are




μ−1 for the residential and the
non-residential sectors respectively. The distributed goods are then produced with the following tech-
nology YD =











. The corresponding aggregate price indexes
are deﬁned as PD =





for the residential sector and P =
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non-residential sector. The distribution goods serve as ﬁnal consumption goods for households and are
used by capital and housing stock producers.
Retailers are monopolistic competitors which buy and the homogenous intermediate products of the
entrepreneurs at prices MCt for the non-residential intermediate goods and MCD,t for the residential
intermediate goods. The intermediate products are then differentiatedand sold back to the distributors.
Retailers set their prices on a staggered basis àl aCalvo [1983]. In each period, a retailer in the non-
residential sector faces a constant probability 1 − ξC (resp. 1 − ξD in the residential sector) of being able
to re-optimize its nominal price. If they cannot re-optimize their price, the price evolves according to

























3.3.3 Capital and housing stock producers
Usingdistributedresidentialandnon-residentialgoods, asegment of perfectlycompetitive ﬁrms, owned
by the patient households, produce a stock of housing and ﬁxed capital. At the beginning of period
t, those ﬁrms buy back the depreciated housing stocks from both households types (1 − δ)Dt−1 and
(1 − δ)   Dt−1 as well as the depreciated capital stocks (1 − δK)KC
t−1, (1 − δK)KD
t−1 at real prices (in
terms of consumption goods) QD,tTD,t,   QD,tTD,t, QD
t , QC
t respectively. Then they augment the various
stocks using distributed goods and facing adjustment costs. The augmented stocks are sold back to en-
trepreneurs and households at the end of the period at the same prices. The decision problem of capital











⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
QC
t (KC





t − (1 − δK)KD
t−1) − ID
t
QD,tTD,t(Dt − (1 − δ)Dt−1) − ID,t
  QD,tTD,t(   Dt − (1 − δ)   Dt−1) −   ID,t
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
subject to the constraints
KC















































S and SD are non-negative adjustment cost functions formulated in terms of the gross rate of change
in investment and εI
t is an efﬁciency shock to the technology of ﬁxed capital accumulation, common
to both sectors. The functional forms adopted are S (x)=φ/2( x − 1)
2 for ﬁxed capital stocks and
SD (x)=φD/2( x − 1)
2 for housing stocks.19
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3.4 The Banking sector
The banking sector is owned by the patient households and is segmented in three parts. Following
Gerali et al. [2009], each banking group is ﬁrst composed of a wholesale branch which gets ﬁnancing in
the money market and allocates funds to the rest of the group, facing an adjustment cost on the overall
capital ratio of the group. The wholesale branch takes the bank capital and the dividend policy as given
in its decision problem and operates under perfect competition. The second segment of the banking
group comprises a deposit branch which collects savings from the patient households and place them
in the money markets as well as two loan book ﬁnancing branches which receive funding from the
wholesale branch and allocate them to the commercial lending branches. In this second segment, banks
operate under monopolistic competition and face nominal rigidity in their interest rate settings. The
third segment of the banking group is formed by two commercial lending branches which provide loan
contracts to impatient households and entrepreneurs. The commercial lending branches are zero proﬁt
competitive ﬁrms.
3.4.1 Wholesale branch
The perfectly competitive wholesale branches receives deposits Depwb
t , from the retail deposit banks,
with an interest rate set at the policy rate Rt. Taking as given the bank capital Bankcapt in real terms,
they provide loans Bwb
E,t and Bwb
HH,t at interest rates Rwb
E,t and Rwb
HH,tto the loan book ﬁnancing branches
for lending to entrepreneurs and households respectively. When deciding on deposits and loans, the
wholesale banks are constrained by an adjustment cost on bank’s leverage. This friction is meant to cap-
ture the capital requirement pressures on the banks behavior. For this reason, we assume that wholesale
bankstargetacapitalratioof 11%andthequadraticcost is supposedto illustrate thevarious interactions
between banks’ balance sheet structure, market disciplining forces and the regulatory framework.17 On
the one hand, this reﬂects that owing to pecuniary andreputational costs banks arekeen to avoidgetting
too close to the regulatory minimum capital requirement and hence tend to operate with a substantial
buffer over that minimum capital ratio.18 On the other hand, bank capital is costly relative to other
sources of ﬁnancing (like deposits and bond issuance) implying that banks tend to economize on the
amount of capital they hold.19
Under the Basel I-like capital requirement regime, the bank’s static proﬁt maximization problem can be






























17The 11% capital ratio target corresponds to the average (risk-adjusted) total capital ratio of the around 100 largest euro area
banks for the period 1999-2008; according to Datastream (Worldscope).
18There is a rich literature providing evidence that banks’ operate with substantial capital buffers; for some recent studies see
e.g. Ayuso et al. [2004], Bikker and Metzemakers [2004], Berger et al. [2008], Gropp and Heider [2009], and Stolz and Wedow
[2005].
19For example, ECB estimates of the cost of equity, cost of market-based debt (i.e. bond issuance) and the cost of deposits for
euro area banks show that the former was on average around 6.7% in the period 2003-2009. During the same period, banks’ cost
of raising debt in the capital markets was around 5%, while their average cost of deposit funding was close to 2%.20
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As in Gerali et al. (2009) the derived lending spreads emphasize "the role of bank capital in determining
loan supply conditions". Hence, on the one hand, if the spread between the lending rate and the policy
rate is positive, the bank would have an incentive to increase proﬁts by raising loan volumes. This,
on the other hand, would increase its leverage, which is however penalized by regulatory rules and
market disciplining forces; as the capital ratio moves away from its target, which poses a cost to the
bank. The bank’s decision problemis thereforeﬁnely balancedbetween boosting its proﬁts via increased
leverageand retaining control of its capitalstructure. Moreover, a key point to notice for our Basel I-type
speciﬁcation is that the bank’s target capital ratio is insensitive to changes in borrower risk over time. In
addition, reﬂecting the risk weighting of the Basel I regulatory framework, household loans are given a
(ﬁxed) risk weight of 50% whereas the risk weight attached to corporate loans is 100%.
The decision problem of the wholesale bank leads to the following condition on the spread between the
lending rate and the policy rate
Rwb

























When the leverage of the bank increases beyond the targeted level, banks increase their loan-deposit
margins.
The capital base of the wholesale branch is accumulated out of retained earnings form the bank group
proﬁts





where δwb represents the resources used in managing bank capital, Πb
t is the overall proﬁt of the bank
group and νb is the share of proﬁts not distributed to the patient households.
3.4.2 Imperfect pass-through of policy rate on bank lending rates
The retail deposit branch and the loan book ﬁnancing branches are monopolistic competitors and set
their interest rates on a staggered basis with some degree of nominal rigidity àl aC a l v o .
Retail deposit branch The deposits offered to patient households are a CES aggregation of the dif-
















D−1 < −1.T h e











Retail deposit branches are monopolistic competitors which collect deposit from savers and place them
in the money market. Deposit branches set interest rates on a staggered basis àl aCalvo (1983), facing
each period a constant probability 1 − ξR
D of being able to re-optimize their nominal interest rate. When




Working Paper Series No 1251
October 2010





























D−1 Dept+k andΛt isthemarginalvalueofnon-residential
consumption for the households savers.
Am a r k u ps h o c kεR
D,t is introduced on the interest rate setting.
Loan book ﬁnancing branches As for the retail deposit branches, loan book ﬁnancing branches pro-
vide funds to the commercial lending branches which obtain overall ﬁnancing through a CES aggre-










as regards commercial loans to en-






















1. The corresponding average lending rate is
RE =



















Loanbook ﬁnancing branchesfor eachsegment of the creditmarket aremonopolistic competitors which
levy funds from the wholesale branches and set interest rates on a staggered basis àl aCalvo (1983),
facing each period a constant probability 1 − ξR
E and 1 − ξR
HH of being able to re-optimize their nominal
interest rate. If a loan book ﬁnancing branch cannot re-optimize its interest rate, the interest rate is left
at its previous period level:
RHH,t(j)=RHH,t−1(j)
RE,t(j)=RE,t−1(j)































As for deposit rates, we add markup shocks εR
HH,t and εR
E,t to the staggered nominal lending rate set-
tings.
Commercial lending branches Commercial lending branches are delivering credit contracts for en-
trepreneurs and household borrowers. Those branches are perfectly competitive and in equilibrium
have zero proﬁts. Details on the credit contract and the decision problems for the commercial lending
branches are provided in the sections on entrepreneurs and household borrowers.22
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3.5 Government and monetary authority
Public expenditures G are subject to random shocks εG
t . The government ﬁnances public spending with
lump-sum transfers.
Monetary policy is speciﬁed in terms of an interest rate rule targeting inﬂation, output and their ﬁrst
difference as well as changes in the relative price of housing. Written in deviation from the steady state,
the interest rate rule used has the following form:






where lower case letters denote log-deviations of a variable from its deterministic steady-state.
3.6 Market clearing conditions
Aggregate domestic demands for non-residential goods are given by:
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dc measures price dispersion among intermediate products.




















  Dt − (1 − δ)   Dt−1
 











dd measures price dispersions among non-residential intermediate
goods.
On the credit market, due to nominal rigidity in the setting of interest rate by retail banking branches,























i −1 dji∈{ E,HH,D} are dispersion indexes among retail bank interest
rates.
Aggregate bank proﬁt is given by
Πb
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3.7 Alternative commercial lending contracts
Compared with the benchmark model presented above, we consider two additional variants for the
credit contracts proposed to households and ﬁrms.
First, we assume now that the commercial lending branches propose credit contracts where the lending
rate is not contingent on the realization of aggregate uncertainty.
Second, we consider a speciﬁcation of the credit frictions which does not allow for strategic default and
which consists in constraining the amount of new loans by the value of the available collateral. The
modeling strategy using binding collateral constraints is similar to Gerali et al. [2009].
4 Bayesian Estimation
The model is estimated euro area data using Bayesian likelihood methods. We consider 15 key macroe-
conomic quarterly time series from 1986q1 to 2008q2: output, consumption, non-residential ﬁxed in-
vestment, hours worked, real wages, CPI inﬂation rate, 3 month short-term interest rate, residential
investment, real house prices, household loans, non-ﬁnancial corporation loans, households deposits,
bank lending rates on household loans, on non-ﬁnancial corporation loans and on household deposits.
All real variables and real house prices are linearly detrended prior to estimation. Inﬂation and nominal
interest rates are mean-adjusted (see the calibration section for more details). Full description of the
dataset is provided in the Appendix.
We summarize here the exogenous stochastic shocks that we introduce:
• Efﬁcient shocks: AR(1) technology (εA
t (common to both sectors), AR(1) housing-speciﬁc technol-
ogy ε
AD
t ), AR(1) non-residential investment speciﬁc productivity (εI
t), AR(1) labor supply (εL
t ),
AR(1) public expenditure (εG
t ), AR(1) consumption preferences (εB
t ), AR(1) housing preferences
(εD
t )
• Inefﬁcient shocks: i.i.d price markup (εP





• Riskiness shocks: the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic risk for impatient households and
entrepreneurs is subject to AR(1) shocks (εσ
HH,t, εσ
E,t)
• AR(1) bank capital shock (ε
Bankcap
t )
• Monetary policy shock (εR
t ).
As regards behavioral parameters, we chose to limit the number of estimated coefﬁcients by bringing
some symmetry across sectors and agents.We estimate the parameters driving the adjustment costs on
residential and non-residential investment, φD, φ, which are the same across household types and sec-
tors respectively. The parameter on capacity utilization adjustment cost ϕ is also the same for both
sectors. Concerning preference parameters, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σX, is similar
for the two household types, the labor supply elasticity, σL, is the same across household types and
sector-speciﬁc labor service, whereas the habit parameter, h, is equalized across all agents. The Calvo24
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parameters on nominal wage rigidity, αwC, αwD, are the same for both household types while we in-
troduce a single indexation parameter γw. The Calvo parameter on non-residential retail goods price
setting, ξC, and the associated indexation coefﬁcients, γC, are estimated while in the residential goods
sector, weestimate the Calvoparameter,ξD, andset the indexation parameter,γD, tozero. Onthe imper-
fect interest rate pass-through, we draw some inference on the three coefﬁcients driving the staggered
rate setting on deposits and loans, ξR
D, ξR
HH, ξR
E. The adjustment cost on banks’ capital structure, χwb,i s
also estimated. Finally the parameters in the Taylor rule are ρ, rπ,r y,r Δπ,r Δy,r TD.
In the benchmark estimation, we do not introduce the share of households borrowers. As argued later
on, given the weak identiﬁcation of the parameter and the lack of observable data on households het-
erogenous features,we calibratedthis parametertoachieve realisticdebtstructureinthe steady state. At
the same, some inference and sensitivity analysis on this coefﬁcient is presented thereafter. Calibrating
the share of borrowers is also symmetric to our assumption that all ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained.
4.1 Calibrated parameters and steady state
Some parameters are excluded from the estimation and have to be calibrated. These are typically pa-
rameters driving the steady state values of the state variables, for which the econometric model based
on detrended data is almost noninformative.
The discount factors are calibrated to 0.995 for the patient agents and 0.96 for the impatient agents
and entrepreneurs 20. The implied equilibrium real deposit interest rate is 2% in annual terms21.T h e
depreciation rate for housing, δ, is equal to 0.01, corresponding to an annual rate of 4%, whereas the
depreciation rate of capital, δX, is set to 0.1. Markups are equal to 1.3 in the goods markets (for both
nonresidential and residential goods) and 1.5 in the labor market (in each sector). The relative share
of residential goods in the utility function, ωD, is set to 0.1 for both household types. The value is
chosen to pin down the steady state ratio of residential investment to GDP. The intratemporal elasticity
of substitution, ηD,i se q u a lt o1. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution of entrepreneurs is set
to 1 (σCE). The relative shares of inputs in production are 0.3 for capital (α) and 0.7 for labor in the
nonresidential goods sector, while in the residential sector we assign a weight equal to 0.1 to land (αL),
and reduce the share of capital to 0.2 (αD), in order to maintain the level of labor intensity unchanged.
The markups on loan and deposit rates are calibrated so that the margin between the loan rate and the
deposit rate is 100 bps in annual terms, while the annual spreads on lending rates to households and
entrepreneurs are 200 bps and 120 bps, respectively. Those numbers are very close to the historical av-
erages from 1999Q1 to 2008Q2.22 Given the discount factors and the markups on retail interest rates, the
steady state value for the default cut-off points  E,  HH are numerically determined by the modiﬁed
Euler equations of borrowers and entrepreneurs. Once those cut-off points are computed and assuming
monitoring costs of 0.2 for non-ﬁnancial corporations, μE, and 0.15 for households, μHH, the standard
deviations of the idiosyncratic shocks areadjusted to reproducedefaultfrequencies for impatient house-
20See e.g. Iacoviello [2005]a n dIacoviello and Neri [2009]a n dMonacelli [2009] for a thorough discussion of the calibration of
the discount factors in a similar setup.
21The steady-state level of the interest rate is pinned down by the savers’ intertemporal discount factor.
22We conﬁne the calibration of the loan-deposit margin and the lending spreads to the period starting in 1999Q1, as due to the
convergence of interest rates prior to the introduction of the euro there was a gradual downward level shift in loan and deposit
rates in the years preceding 1999. Because of this structural shift in the level of rates, for the steady state calibration we apply the
pattern of loan and deposit rates for the euro-period only.25
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holds and ﬁrms of 0.3% and 0.7% respectively.23
Finally, we set in the benchmark estimation the share of borrowers ω at 0.25. The loan-to-value ratio
(determined by the terms (1 − χE) for non-ﬁnancial corporations and (1 − χHH) for impatient house-
holds) are then determined to ensure plausible debt to GDP ratio in the steady state. With (1 − χE) at
0.6 and (1 − χHH) at 0.2, the share of corporate loans to annual GDP is around 33% while the share of
household housing loans to annual GDP is around 25%. This calibration is close to the levels recorded
in the euro area around the year 2000 as well as to their historical average levels since 1980. Besides, the
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio are consistent with the available range of estimates.24
4.2 Prior distributions
The standard errors of the structural shocks are assumed to follow a Uniform distribution, while the
persistence parameters follow a Beta distribution with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.2.
About the parameters of the monetary policy reaction function, we follow Smets and Wouters [2005]
quite closely. The interest rate smoothing parameter follows a Beta distribution with parameters 0.75
and 0.1. The parameters capturing the response to changes in inﬂation and output gap follow a Gamma
distribution with parameters 0.3 and 0.1, and 0.12 and 0.05, respectively. Concerning the response to
inﬂation and output gap, the prior distributions are a Normal with mean 2.5 and standard deviation
0.25, and a Gamma with parameters 0.12 and 0.05, respectively. The prior on the level inﬂation terms
has been increased compared with the empirical DSGE literature as the determinacy region in the two-
sector economy considered in this paper requires stronger reaction to price pressures.
About preference parameters, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, which is common to both
household types, follows a Gamma distribution with mean 1.2 and standard deviation 0.2. The habit
formation parameter is also the same savers, borrowers and entrepreneurs, following a Beta distribu-
tion with parameters 0.75 and 0.1. The elasticity of labor supply is the same for both household types
and sectors, and has a Gamma(1.5, 0.1) prior distribution. On the production side, the adjustment cost
parameters for ﬁxed investment and the capacity utilization elasticity, which are common to both sec-
tors, follow respectively a Normal(4, 1.5) and a Beta(0.5, 0.15) prior distributions. The prior distribu-
tion regarding the adjustment cost parameter for residential investments of savers and borrowers is a
Gamma(1,0.5). About nominal rigidities, the Calvo parameters for price setting in the non-residential
sector and wage settings in each sector are distributed according to a Beta distribution with mean 0.75
and standard deviation 0.0525. The indexation parameters are instead centered around 0.5, with a stan-
dard deviation of 0.15. In the residential sector, we set lower priors for the nominal price rigidities, with
aBeta(0.2,0.1)given assumptions madein theliteratureon the ﬂexibility of housing prices(seeIacoviello
23This is consistent with corporate default statistics from Moody’s, the rating agency, which show an average default rate on
(non-US) non-ﬁnancial corporate bonds of 0.75% for the period 1989-2009. Household default rates can be approximately derived
using the loan write-off data in the ECB’s MFI balance sheet statistics. Computing the ratio of average write-offs on mortgage
loans to corporate loans for the period of available data (2001-2009) it is found that the share of defaulting mortgage loans to
corporate loans is c. 45%. Hence, using the non-ﬁnancial corporate default rate derived from Moody’s implies an approximate
mortgage default rate of 0.34%; i.e. close to our steady state calibrated value.
24LTV ratios for euro area housing loans differ across countries, but tend on average to lie in the range of 0.7-0.8%; see ECB
(2009), "Housing Finance in the Euro Area", Occasional Paper no. 101. LTV ratios can be approximated by the debt-to-ﬁnancial
asset ratio of the non-ﬁnancial corporate sector, which on average between 1999-2009 was around 0.45.; sources: ECB and Eurostat
and ECB calculations.
25In the estimation exercise we impose that the same level of nominal rigidity applies to the saver’s and borrower’s wages in a
given sector. Such restriction is motivated by the availability of sector-speciﬁc, as opposed to individual-speciﬁc data on wages.26
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and Neri [2009] for example). We do not introduce indexation on past inﬂation in the residential sector
price setting.
Turning to the Calvo parameters driving the imperfect pass-through of policy rate on lending rates, we
choose fairly uninformative priors with Beta(0.5,0.2). The sensitivity of bank spreads on bank capital
ratio inadequacy has relative tight priors, with a Gamma(20,2.5), as in Gerali et al. [2009]. Finally, in the
benchmark model, the share of borrowers is not estimated but in alternative speciﬁcations we introduce
priors following Beta distribution, with mean 0.35 and standard deviation 0.05. This choice is similar to
the one of Iacoviello and Neri [2009]. The model is still well-deﬁned when the share of borrowers goes
to zero so that the estimation of the parameters is not affected by a singular point in zero.
4.3 Posterior distributions
We performed Bayesian estimations on various speciﬁcations of the theoretical model described previ-
ously. Thereafter we call benchmark speciﬁcation the version of the model where commercial lending
rates are state-contingent. We also consider the estimation of models with pre-determined lending rates
or with binding collateral constraints. Regarding the range of free parameters for the estimation, the
inclusion on the share of borrowers as well as some correlations between structural shocks will be con-
sidered.
Tables 1 and 2 report the mode, the mean and the 10th and 90th percentiles of the posterior distribution
ofthe structuralparametersfor the benchmark model andthe pre-determinedlending ratespeciﬁcation.
Table 3 presents the estimation results for the model speciﬁcation assuming always binding collateral
constraints. When comparing the marginal data density of the three model speciﬁcations, it clearly
appears that the benchmark version delivers the best statistical performance with a log data density of
-432.1. The model with binding collateral constraints, which should be seen as relatively close to Gerali
et al. [2009], has the lowest log data density, at -650, while the model with predetermined lending rates
leads to intermediate level, at - 579.3.
Thereafter,we concentrate on the parameter estimates, emphasizing those features that are more closely
related to our expanded modeling framework with respect to the sectoral structure of the economy
and ﬁnancial frictions. Among the stochastic exogenous disturbances, the posterior distributions for
autoregressive coefﬁcients turned out to be very close to unity for several shocks, notably those related
to the housing sector, housing preferenceand productivity shocks, and to loan dynamics, risk shocks on
households and entrepreneurs (or alternatively loan-to-value ratio shocks for the model with binding
collateral constraints). Visual inspection of de-trended real house prices and loan data over the sample
indeedsuggest very high degreesof persistence which arenot well capturedby the internal propagation
of the model. The mark-up shocks on bank interest rates also display high autoregressive coefﬁcients
with the notable exception of lending rates to households for which lower inertia seems to compensate
for higher nominal rigidity (see thereafter).
Turning to behavioral parameters, qualitative similarities appear across model speciﬁcations. This con-
cernsﬁrst the realrigidities on non-residential investment andcapacityutilization aswell asthe nominal
rigidities wage setting and on price setting in the non-residential sector. In all estimations, the labor sup-
ply elasticity as well as the inﬂation term in level in the monetary policy rule are weakly identiﬁed. The
various estimations do not support the evidence of meaningful speciﬁc reaction of monetary policy to27
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house prices.
Then the Calvo parameters on the imperfect adjustment of lending rates are estimated to be the lowest
for deposit rates, at around 0.3 in the benchmark estimation, the highest for lending rates to households,
ataround 0.9 in the benchmark estimation, and somewhat in between for lending ratesto entrepreneurs,
ataround0.75 in the benchmark estimation. The higher ﬂexibility of deposit rates is also found byGerali
et al. [2009]and is most likely due to differencesin the maturity structures of the various composite rates
which cannot be accounted for by the one-period loans considered in the DSGE model.
Finally, the posterior distribution for the adjustment cost on banks’ capital structure, χwb,s t a y sv e r y
close to its prior distribution in all model speciﬁcations. At the same time, having experimented with
alternative priors, the posterior distribution could eventually depart signiﬁcantly from the prior one,
therefore suggesting that data are somewhat informative about this parameter.
Themaindifferencein theestimation resultsofthethreemodelspeciﬁcations relatestotherealandnom-
inal rigidities for the residentialsector. The benchmark estimation leads to an adjustment cost parameter
for residential investment, φD, of around 0.2 at the mode. The degree of nominal rigidity is then quite
elevated with a posterior mode for the Calvo parameter on residential prices of 0.81. By contrast, the es-
timation of the models with pre-determined lending rate or binding collateral constraints points to low
nominal rigidities and no adjustment cost on residential investment. As we will see later, the real rigidi-
ties in the residential sector have compounded effects on macroeconomic propagation through house-
holds’ borrowing constraint and consequently households’ consumption expenditures. Compared with
the benchmark speciﬁcation, the response of consumption to economic disturbances under binding col-
lateral constraints is very sensitive to adjustment costs on residential investment. Overall, it seems that
data call for some degree of real rigidity in the residential markets. Everything else being equal, this
implies that relative prices would react more to economic shocks. In order to limit the volatility of res-
idential prices in the presence of adjustment costs on residential investment, staggered housing price
setting is needed. However, this combination of real and nominal rigidity which improves the per-
formance of the model in the benchmark speciﬁcation, interferes with binding collateral constraints in
particular.
Tables 4and5show theposteriorparameterdistributions forthebenchmarkmodelandthepre-determined
lending rate speciﬁcation, introducing correlations between the consumption preference shock and the
housing preference shock on the one hand, and between the housing preference shocks and the house-
hold risk shock on the other hand. These experiments were guided by the correlations of structural
shocks obtained in the benchmark estimations.
The innovation on the consumption preference shock, εB
t , has been introduced in the AR(1) process of
thehousing preferenceshock. Such a positive correlationbetweenboth exogenous disturbancesis partly
correctingforthe sharpnegativeco-movement aftera consumption preferenceshock betweenconsump-
tion and residential investment, which may not be supported by data given the positive unconditional
correlation observed in our sample. The introduction of the innovation on the housing preferenceshock
in the AR(1) process of the risk shock on housing loans is limiting the negative co-movement between
residential price and residential investment on the one hand and lending rate spreads to households on
the other hand. The presence of such correlations is affecting the inference on behavioral parameters.
In particular, the estimated real and nominal rigidities for the residential sector become much higher
in the pre-determined lending rate speciﬁcation, at levels close to the ones obtained in the benchmark28
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speciﬁcation.
In the results reported in tables 4 and 5, we also let the share of household borrowers, ω,f r e ei nt h e
estimation procedure. The prior distribution for this parameter was set with a relatively elevated mean
and small variance. For the benchmark model, the posterior distribution for the household borrowers’
share reaches 28% at the mode. The posterior mode is lower in the pre-determined lending rate speci-
ﬁcation. Overall, ω does not seem to be strongly identiﬁed. This conﬁrms the results of Darracq Pariès
and Notarpietro [2008]. The presence of borrowers is not rejected by the data, as all speciﬁcations lead
to strictly positive values for such shares, but model comparison based on marginal data density would
favor lower shares than in the benchmark estimation.
4.4 Forecast errors decomposition
We also analyze the role of credit market frictions and ﬁnancial shocks in economic ﬂuctuations. Table
6 and 7 report unconditional variance decomposition of HP-ﬁltered variables, for the three model spec-
iﬁcations, emphasizing the contribution of housing-related structural shocks and shocks to the banking
sector. For each model, the variance decomposition is computed using the posterior modes of their re-
spective estimation. Therefore results across models reﬂect both differences in behavioral speciﬁcations
as well as in parameter estimates.
We will comment ﬁrst on the variance decomposition of the benchmark model. More than 50% of
unconditional variance of loans to households and entrepreneurs are explained by their respective risk
shock. Indeed, looking at zero proﬁt condition for household loans for example




we see that the term G( HH,t) could be interpreted as a time-varying loan-to-value ratio and is directly
relatedto the risk shock on household borrowers. In the empirical exercise, this shock is therefore partly
capturing the gap between the dynamics of loans and the dynamics of its collateral value. Household
deposits are mainly driven by risk shocks on households and entrepreneurs as well as by bank capital
shocks, with a respective contribution or around 20%. Those disturbances have a strong impact on bank
assets and capital, thereby mechanically affecting bank liabilities. Overall, approximately 20% of the
unconditional volatility of loans and deposits are driven by disturbances not related to the ﬁnancial or
housing blocks.
On bank lending rates, for each sector, the risk shock and the interest rate markup shock have strong
contributions, explaining jointly more than 50% of variance. By contrast, the role of ﬁnancial shocks is
more limited as regards the volatility of deposit rates.
Turning to the residential sector, the housing preferenceshock explains a largepart of price and quantity
in this sector. The housing-speciﬁc productivity shock contributes mainly to residential investment
volatility. On balance, 40% of residential investment and 60% of real housing prices are driven by non
housing-speciﬁc disturbances.
For the non-residential sector, the corporate-risk shock has a largecontribution to non-residential invest-
ment ﬂuctuations, whereas the household-risk shock contributes signiﬁcantly to consumption volatility,
albeit to a lesser extent. The housing preference shock as well as the interest rate markup shock on de-
posits are non-negligible sources of consumption unconditional variance. For GDP, consumption and29
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non-residential investment, roughly 50% of unconditional variances are not explained by ﬁnancial and
housing-speciﬁc shocks.
Finally, on consumer prices, the risk shocks and the interest rate shock on deposits have some meaning-
ful contributions but almost 80% of variance is driven by disturbances not related to the ﬁnancial or the
housing blocks.
The decomposition of variance in the benchmark model is substantially modiﬁed when considering
the estimated models with the alternative speciﬁcations for the credit contracts. Certainly, in the pre-
determined lending rate and binding collateral constraint models, the credit market shocks also account
for most of the unconditional variance of loans, deposit and bank interest rates. However, the differ-
ence in the estimation of real and nominal rigidities in the residential sector seems to strongly affect the
contribution of the housing preference shock. Presumably, the presence of relatively high real and nom-
inal frictions in the benchmark estimation increases the internal persistence of this shock. Moreover, the
relative ﬂexibility of housing prices in the two alternative speciﬁcations may explain the lower contri-
bution of ﬁnancial shocks to consumption price inﬂation. A singularity in the pre-determined lending
rate model regards the role of corporate-risk shock which contributes to GDP volatility by around 25%,
against 4% in the benchmark model.
5 The role of credit frictions in macroeconomic propagation
In this section we consider the macroeconomic implications of the various types of credit frictions em-
bedded in our model, illustrating how the presence of credit market frictions affect the macroeconomic
propagation of shocks to real economic activity.
5.1 Transmissionofnon-ﬁnancialeconomicdisturbancesthroughdemandandsup-
ply credit frictions
In terms of shock transmission, focussing ﬁrst on the benchmark model, Figures 1-15 show the impulse
response functions to the various shocks identiﬁed in Section 3. Overall, the presence of demand and
supply credit frictions tends to amplify the macroeconomic propagation of economic shocks.
Focusing ﬁrst on supply shocks, a positive shock to housing preferences, (εD
t ), via its positive effect on
housing collateral values leads to lower credit spreads on housing loans, which in turn positively af-
fects consumption and increases household loan growth (see Fig. 7). As a reaction, monetary policy is
tightened which leads to a negative spill-over effect on the corporate sector in the form of somewhat
higher corporate lending rates, a decline in corporate loan growth and lower investment growth. De-
posit rates respond quicker to the monetary policy tightening relative to in particular household loan
rates, which leads to an initial reduction of bank capital accumulation. Bank capital, however, increases
subsequently as the monetary policy impact on deposit rates fades out quicker than its impact on lend-
ing rates. Finally, there is an initial positive impact on real GDP and inﬂation, which over the longer
term is counterbalanced by the monetary policy-induced negative spill-over effect on corporate invest-
ment. By contrast, a positive demand shock leading to higher consumption, (εB
t ), has a negative impact
on residential investment and hence collateral values thereby increasing the credit risk premium on
household loans, which in turn also slows down household lending (see Fig. 5). The rise in inﬂation30
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following the shock to consumption induces the central bank to raise its policy rate. As a result, deposit
and lending rates increase. The latter implies a slump in investment and a fading out of the positive
consumption shock. All in all, the negative spill-over to investment results in a muted effect on real
activity. The overall effect on bank capital is rather modest though positive in the long run, which seems
to be driven particularly by a decline in bank deposits and lower bank leverage.
Other efﬁciency shocks, such as technology shocks (εA
t ), shocks to labor supply (εL
t ) and investment (εI
t),
in the baseline have the usual positive impact on real activity and the ampliﬁcation impact of ﬁnancial
intermediation is broadly similar to the ﬁndings of Gerali et al. [2009] as the policy-induced reduction
in lending rates increases loan demand. The greater availability of credit ampliﬁes the initial impact
on spending and investment. Overall, bank proﬁtability is broadly unaffected by these shocks due to
the counterbalancing effects on both the asset and liability sides of the bank balance sheets (i.e. higher
lending and higher deposits and a muted impact on bank leverage).
In terms of the shock to monetary policy, (εR
t ), as illustrated in Figure 15 the rise in the policy rate
lowers output and inﬂation. This fuels a decline in asset prices and hence collateral values, which in
turn lowers the credit available to households and ﬁrms and hence leads to a propagation of the initial
shock via the presence of ﬁnancial intermediation. Somewhat puzzling, however, we observe an initial
positive reaction of loans to households and, in particular, ﬁrms.26 Notably, the transitory shock to
monetary policy is only to a limited extent passed on to bank lending rates. This largely reﬂects the
forward-looking, but staggered, price-setting behavior of the imperfectly competitive banks whereby
lending rates are set according to expected future conﬁgurations of the yield curve. A transitory shock
to short-term (policy) rates therefore does not have a signiﬁcant impact on lending rates predominantly
referring to the longer end of the yield curve, such as mortgage loans. The fact that monetary policy
accommodates the initial negative impact on output and inﬂation results in only transitory negative
real economic implications from the policy shock. Finally, bank capital is overall affected only to a
limited extent.
5.2 Risk shocks on households and entrepreneurs
Via the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism, changes in borrower creditworthiness is propagated through-
out the economy in the presence of credit market frictions.
Hence, shocks to borrower riskiness, (εσ
HH,t and εσ
E,t) respectively, by raising default probabilities re-
duces lending to and spending by the affectedsector (see Fig. 12 and 13). The resulting monetary policy
accommodation in turn has moderate positive spill-over effects on the other borrowing sector, which
over time somewhat helps attenuate the immediate slowdown of GDP growth. Bank proﬁtability is
overall negatively affected by lower lending rates and the broad decline in lending activity.
This underlines the importance of banks’ risk perception in guiding their lending behavior and stresses
its potential amplifying effect on economic ﬂuctuations. Sharp deteriorations in the creditworthiness of
households and ﬁrms, as for example observed during the 2007-9 ﬁnancial crisis, 27 are therefore likely
26Similar evidence for the euro area is found in Christiano et al. [2010] .L i k e w i s e ,i na ne m p i r i c a lp a p e rGiannoni et al. [2009]
provide evidence of an increase of non-ﬁnancial corporate loan growth in response to a monetary policy shock. Similar ﬁndings
have previously been found for the US; see e.g. Bernanke and Gertler [1995]a n dChristiano et al. [1996]. Among other reasons,
this pattern could be due to an increase in demand to ﬁnance increased inventories, a reduced utilization of the workforce or a
drawing down of pre-committed credit lines.
27For example, expected default frequencies of euro area non-ﬁnancial corporations (which is a measure of corporate default31
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to produce reverberating feedback effects on real economic activity.
5.3 Interest rate markup shocks and bank interest rate pass-through
A common ﬁnding in the empirical literature is that banks only gradually pass on the changes in mon-
etary policy rates to the rates offered to their retail customers. This sluggishness may thus affect the
speed and effectiveness of the monetary policy transmission via the interest rate channel. The frictions
are furthermore often found to be asymmetric in the sense that bank lending rates tend to adjust quicker
as a response to policy rate increases than to policy rate decreases.28
The magnitude and speed of bank lending rate pass-through are often associated with the degree of
imperfect competition in the banking sector and the presence of nominal adjustment ("menu") costs.
These frictions may deter banks from reacting on a regular basis to changes in policy and market rates,
and banks may instead choose to delay the adjustment of their lending rates until the change in market
ratesexceedsacertainthreshold. Beyondthis, other factorsrelatedtoﬁnancialintermediationmayaffect
the developments in the spreads between bank lending rates and market rates, such as costs related to
interest rate and credit risk, the banks’ degree of risk aversion, unit operating costs, bank liquidity and
productdiversiﬁcation. Also the conduct of monetary policy may impact on how quickly banks respond
to policy rate changes.29
Another common observation is that there are differences across retail bank products in terms of the
speed and degree with which banks pass-through changes in policy rates facing their borrowers and
depositors. These differences can, among other things, be assumed to hinge on the degree of market
power the bank has in particular segments. For instance, it can be assumed that large ﬁrms are in a
better bargaining position vis-à-vis the bank than are its retail customers. Accordingly, it is often found
that corporate loan rates (and certain deposit rates) adjust to policy rate changes in a speedier and
sometimes more complete way than rates on loans to households. Indeed, this is the pattern we observe
when running an error-correctionmodel relating our composite loan and deposit rates to changes in the
policy rate. Whereas corporate loan rates are relatively quick to adjust to monetary policy changes, the
adjustment is somewhat slower in the case of mortgage rates (and to a certain extent also deposit rates).
The sluggishness of retail bank interest rates is another friction affecting the way shocks are propagated
to the real economy. As an illustration, the ampliﬁcations caused by shocks to the interest rate markups
are shown in Figures 9-11. A positive shock to deposit rates, (εR
D,t), has a positive effect on both con-
sumption, residential investment and property prices. The latter improves housing collateral values
and hence lower the spread on loans to households. The increase in demand results in positive effects
on real activity and inﬂation forcing the central bank to tighten monetary policy, which in turn causes
negative spill-over effects on corporate investment (owing to higher lending rates). Accordingly, the
positive impact on real GDP turns out to be relatively short-lived and it fades away over the longer
term. Finally, the combination of lower bank rates and a decline in deposit taking as well as lower bank
risk produced by Moody’s KMV) increased six-fold between June 2007 and December 2009. Likewise, according to the ECB
Bank Lending Survey, the net percentage of banks reporting that risk perceptions contributed to a tightening of credit standards
increased from 9% in Q2 2007 to 46% in Q4 2008 with respect to mortgage loans. and from -4% in Q2 2007 to 64% in Q4 2008 with
respect to loans to enterprizes.
28See e.g. Mester and Saunders [1995], Mojon [2001]a n dGropp et al. [2007].
29For instance Sander and Kleimeier [2006] argue that better anticipated monetary policy implies a quicker response of retail
bank interest rates.32
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leverage implies a positive impact on banks’ capital accumulation over the horizon. A lower credit risk
premium on loans to households, (εR
HH,t), by boosting household borrowers’ access to loan ﬁnancing
positively impacts on consumption and residential investment. As a response to the ensuing inﬂation-
ary pressures, the central bank raises its policy rate, which in turn leads to a lagged response on bank
loan and deposit rates. The higher cost of ﬁnancing for entrepreneurs negatively impacts investment
and gradually also the initial impact on consumption and residential investment diminishes. Similarly,
the immediate positive impact on GDP growth fades away over time. Moreover, the combination of
the fall in corporate lending and the higher deposit fu n d i n gc o s t sa sw e l la si n c r e a s i n gb a n kl e v e r a g e
results in a lasting decline in bank capital. A similar pattern is observedin the case of a negative shock to
corporate credit spreads, (εR
E,t), although in this case investment is temporarily positively affectedwhile
there are negative spill over effects on consumption and housing activity. The initial impact on GDP is
more muted relative to the household loan markup shock, but it remains positive also in the long run.
The importance of retail bank interest rate rigidities is furthermore highlighted in Figures 1-8 and Fig-
ures 12-15, which show impulse response functions for the case where banks have no market power
when setting rates and where consequently the pass-through of policy rates to bank interest rates is
immediate and complete are shown (green dotted lines). Overall, this implies that monetary policy ac-
commodation to the various shocks hitting the economy is transmitted fully and more quickly to the
interest rates facing savers and borrowers. Hence, the counterbalancing impact of monetary policy is
more powerful in this case. In other words, the common ﬁnding that the bank interest rate pass-through
is sluggish implies a somewhat attenuated impact of the policy rate changes through the interest rate
channel of monetary policy transmission.
5.4 Bank capital shocks and bank capital channel
The recent ﬁnancial crisis led banks to incur substantial losses on their trading and loan books, which in
turn put severe pressure on their capital positions. In order to return to a more stable capital situation
and possibly responding to pressures from regulators and market participants to operate with more
solid capital buffers, banks have been faced with a trade-off of either raising new capital or adjusting
their asset side, or (more likely) a combination of the two. Our model speciﬁcation can be used to
assess the macroeconomic implications of such shocks to bank capital, which in our case will lead banks
to replenish their capital position by boosting their retained earnings. This is illustrated in Figure 14,
which shows the implications of an adverse shock to bank capital, (ε
Bankcap
t ). The bank capital shock
results in an increase in bank leverage which in order for banks to reestablish their target leverage ratio
leadsto an increasein banks’ loan-deposit margins. This is drivenmainly by higher lending rates, which
in turn lowers loan demand.30 Real activity falls somewhat and the impact of the bank capital shock is
protracted, despite diminishing slightly over time in response to the monetary policy accommodation.
The negative impact on output of the bank capital shock in the benchmark model is relatively modest
but persistent.31
30This mechanism is corroborated by empirical ﬁndings for the US, which suggests that pressure on bank capital positions
induce banks to apply higher lending rates (in particular vis-à-vis their riskier borrowers); see Santos and Winton [2009].
31Recent empirical studies suggests an approximate effect of a one percentage point shock to bank capital positions (or loan
supply shocks more generally) in the range of an approx. 0.1-1.0 percentage point impact on real economic activity; see e.g.
Cappiello et al. [2010], Ciccarelli et al. [2009], Francis and Osborne [2009]a n dVan den Heuvel [2008]. Our baseline estimates are
at the lower end of this range.33
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The speciﬁc role of the bank capital channel in the propagation of economic shocks via the ﬁnancial
sector can be further analyzed by increasing banks’ adjustment cost on their leverage (setting χwb =5 0 ).
This is illustrated by the blue dotted lines with circles in Figures 1-15. Focusing ﬁrst on a shock to
bank capital itself (Figure 14), it is clear that a more pronounced bank capital channel results in a much
strongerpropagationofshocks fromthebankingsectorto therealeconomy. Consequently, themonetary
policy response is also more forceful than in the benchmark case, which allows for output to rebound
back towards the baseline over time. The immediate effect on output from the bank capital shock is
considerably more pronounced than in the baseline case and corresponds well with evidence from the
empirical literature.
The role of bank capital constraints can also be illustrated in the case of a negative shock to corporate
loan spreads (Figure 11). It is observed that the short-lived boost to investment is muted somewhat in
the presence of a strong bank capital channel, as banks react to the increase in leverage by raising their
loan-deposit margin. Interestingly, also the negative spill-over to investment arising in the context of a
negative shock to mortgage loan spreads (Figure 10) is reinforced when it is more costly for banks to
adjust their capital ratio.
5.5 Comparisonwithpre-determinedlendingratesandbindingcollateralconstraint
speciﬁcation
If the lending rates offered by banks are not contingent on the ex post realization of aggregate uncer-
tainty (i.e. "pre-determined lending rates"; red dashed lines in Fig. 1-15), shocks hitting the economy
tend to have a more muted effect relative to the benchmark scenario. This reﬂects the, in this case, less
pronounced interactive effects between macroeconomic developments (e.g. the accelerator effects on
borrower net worth) and the credit market. This mitigates somewhat the macroeconomic ampliﬁcation
implied by the existence of credit frictions observed in the benchmark case.
Finally, turning to the speciﬁcation with binding collateral constraints (Fig. 16-19; blue dashed lines)
we observe that owing to the resulting more limited borrower access to credit markets the immedi-
ate macroeconomic impact of, for example, adverse shocks to borrower riskiness ((εR
HH,t)a n d( εR
E,t),
respectively) is more pronounced than when collateral constraints are not binding in the strict sense.
This comes about mainly via the more restrictive lending implied by borrowers being bound by their
collateral values.
6 Monetary policy stabilization under different regulatory frame-
works
6.1 Macroeconomic propagation under risk-sensitive capital requirements
Under the risk-sensitive Basel II-like capital requirement regime the static proﬁt maximization problem






































E,t and LEV wb
HH,t are leverage ratios for the corporate and household sectors deﬁned as debt over
collateralized assets. aE
0 ,a E
1 ,bE and aHH
0 ,a HH
1 ,bHH represent coefﬁcients in the linearized version of
the Basel II formula (see below for details). This formulation leads to the following lending spreads
conditioned on the risk-sensitive capital requirements.
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In contrast to the lending spreads derived under the Basel I regulatory regime, the target capital ratio is
now dependenton the riskiness of the banks’borrowers, which is dependenton the stateofthe economy
impinging on borrower net worth (via income and housing wealth on the side of households and via
the value of the capital stock on the side of corporations).
For calculating the steady state linear relationship between Basel II risk weights and leverage we take
as a starting point the Basel II risk-weight formulas and subsequently linearize the resulting risk curves
for entrepreneurs and households around their respective steady state leverage ratios.
As a ﬁrst step, under the Basel II capitaladequacy framework the risk weighted assets are derived using





















where PDE and LGDE refer to probability of default and loss-given-default on corporate exposures,
respectively. Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random variable.
τE denotes the asset-value correlation which parameterizes cross-borrower dependencies and being a

















As we assume a ﬁxed LGD (equal to 0.45), the only time-varying component in the risk weighting is the
PD and the resulting risk curve has a concave nature.













32We focus here on the Foundation Internal Ratings Based approach and assume ﬁxed LGD values provided by the supervisory
authority. For corporate exposures (i.e. entrepreneurs) we assume an LGD value of 0.45 and for household exposures we assume
an LGD value of 0.35 (retail mortgage exposures are presumably better collateralized, hence the lower LGD). We furthermore, for
simplicity, assume a one-year maturity. For more details on the Basel II formulas, see on Banking Supervision [2004].35
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where τHH equals 0.15. Also in the case of household exposures the time-variation of the risk curve
is a function of PDs only (as LGDHH is ﬁxed at 0.35). The risk-weighted assets are subsequently de-
rived as RWAE = CRE ∗ 12.5 ∗ 1.06 ∗ EADE and RWAHH = CRHH ∗ 12.5 ∗ EADHH,w h e r eE A D
denotes exposure-at-default (i.e. Bwb
E,t and Bwb
HH,t for corporate exposures and household exposures,
respectively).33 The time-varying correlation adjustment parameter and the assumed higher LGD for
corporate exposures results in higher risk weights and an initially steeper risk curve relative to the risk
function with respect to household exposures.
In the next step, the Basel II-based risk weight functions can be expressed in terms of borrower leverage,
(G( )) forhouseholds and(GE( E))forentrepreneurs. AscanbeseenfromFigure30thereisapositive
and concave relationship between required capital and the leverage of borrowers, which in turn is a
positive function of the probability of default, ( HH,t) and ( E,t) for households and entrepreneurs,
respectively.
Mechanically,owing to the risk weight functions it can be conjecturedthat shocks to borrower creditrisk
would give rise to higher capital requirements. As credit risk often deteriorates in economic downturns
and improves in upturns, it has been argued that the regulatory risk curves as formulated in Basel II
couldhaveamplifying pro-cyclicaleffectson thebusiness cycle(totheextentthatbankcapitalconstrains
bank lending which in turn may be an imperfect substitute to other ﬁnancing sources).34
At the same time, if banks engage in active management of their loan portfolio, either as a response to or
in anticipation of cyclical requirements to their minimum capital levels, the overall effecton the business
cycle may not be as mechanical as what the simple transposition of the risk weighting to capital require-
ments and lending would prescribe.35 In this respect, the ﬁrst tentative evidence as to the cyclicality of
minimum required capital in the ﬁrst 11
2 years of Basel II provides some interesting, if still preliminary,
insights. Hence, whereas there does indeed seems to be some degree of cyclicality in the underlying risk
parameters (in the sense of higher PDs, and to a lesser extent higher LGDs, in situations with relatively
low economic activity), the impact is so far rather muted. Moreover, despite this observed cyclicality
in risk parameters the resulting minimum required capital until now has remained broadly unaffected
by the period’s economic slowdown. The main reason for the stability of minimum required capital ap-
pears to be that banks have actively engaged in reshufﬂing their portfolios towards less risky exposures,
which has mitigated the effect of the somewhat higher PDs36
Keeping these caveats in mind, we ﬁrst conduct a simple counterfactual exercise. The DSGE model
has been estimated on euro area data, assuming constant capital requirements over the cycle, which is
interpreted as consistent with Basel I regulatory framework. Given the estimated sources of business
cycle ﬂuctuations, we simulate a counterfactual economy where capital requirements are risk-sensitive
according to the Basel II risk weights formula. The model considers two types of risky assets: loans
to households for house purchase and loans to non-ﬁnancial corporations. The counterfactual econ-
omy under Basel II turns out to be marginally more volatile overall, with unchanged monetary policy
rule. Compared with economic ﬂuctuations under Basel I, risk-sensitive capital requirements imply 5%
33The scaling factor of 1.06 in the calculation of the risk weight function for corporate exposures aims at compensating for the
expected overall decline in capital requirements caused by the transition from Basel I to Basel II.
34See e.g. Danielsson et al. [2001], Catarineau-Rabell et al. [2005], Kashyap and Stein [2004].
35See e.g. Gordy and Howells [2006], ?, Jokivuolle et al. [2009]a n dBoissay and Kok Sørensen [2009].
36Apart from the portfolio reshufﬂing impact, a number of other factors may also have contributed to the relative stability of
capital requirements, such as infrequent recalibration of banks’ internal PD estimates, the fact that banks already operate with
so-called "stressed" LGDs and decreases in outstanding credit line commitments reducing the size of exposure at default.36
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higher volatility in real GDP growth and 4% higher volatility in inﬂation.
Thisrelativelylimited impacton macroeconomicvolatility masks morepronounced ampliﬁcationmech-
anisms for speciﬁc sources of economic disturbances, and notably ﬁnancial shocks. Figures 20-24 illus-
trate the impact of more risk-sensitive capital requirements on real and ﬁnancial variables. Focusing
on the different shock ampliﬁcations in the benchmark model (i.e. Basel I; black plain lines) and the
Basel II-based benchmark model (blue dashed lines), we observe that for example a shock to borrower
riskiness (Fig. 21-22) has a more pronounced impact on lending spreads when banks are subject to risk-
sensitive capital requirements. In contrast to the benchmark case, bank lending rates increase allowing
banks to rebuild their capital in response to the higher (risk-weighted) leverage. In the case of a negative
shock to corporate riskiness, investment is more adversely affected under the Basel II framework and
the positive spill-over impact on consumption is more muted relative to the baseline (Basel I). Likewise,
in the case of an adverse shock to household default risk the need for banks to accumulate more capi-
tal results in a negative spill-over effect on the corporate sector (via higher corporate lending spreads).
Overall, we observe that changes in credit risk across time, especially in the case of a shock to corpo-
rate creditworthiness, ampliﬁes the impact on output compared to the situation with ﬂat-rate capital
requirements. This notwithstanding, it is notable that under risk-sensitive capital requirements banks
are found to more actively reshufﬂe their loan portfolio in response to credit risk shocks, as for example
illustrated by the stronger reaction of the volumes of corporate loans and mortgage loans to a shock to
household and corporate creditworthiness, respectively. This might hence exert a mitigating impact on
the pro-cyclical nature of the risk-sensitive capital requirements, although in our speciﬁcation it is not
enough to completely eliminate the cyclical propagation mechanism of the Basel II framework.
Thenegativeshock tobankcapital(Figure23)is furthermorefoundtobeampliﬁedwiththeintroduction
of Basel II rules. Its adverse impact on bank leverage and in turn on bank margins is ampliﬁed by the
reinforced negative feedback effect via time-varying risk weights. This induces banks to raise lending
spreads by more than in the benchmark case and to more aggressively lower their leverage. Overall, the
bank deleveragingneeds arefound to have a more substantial amplifying impact on the macroeconomic
variables under the Basel II framework relative to the benchmark case. A similar pattern is found with
respect to the monetary policy shock (Figure 29), although in this case the amplifying real economic
effects from the introduction of Basel II is much less pronounced. A similar observation can be made
with respect to most of the other efﬁciency and markup shocks. Whereas lending spreads and banks’
proﬁt accumulation appear to react stronger to such shocks, the overall effects on the real side of the
economy is typically less severe.
6.2 Transitional dynamics towards higher capital requirements
Our model is also well-suited to investigate the macroeconomic implications of such changes to the reg-
ulatory framework. The reform of the ﬁnancial regulatory landscape acted in end-2010 (so-called "Basel
III"), following the proposal of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), will lead to higher
required capital for the banking sector.37. The simulations presented thereafter remain illustrative of the
transitional costs of introducing higher capital requirements but should not be interpreted as a quanti-
tative economic assessment of the introduction of Basel III. Indeed, the magnitude of the shock is not
37See BCBS (20010)37
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related to the exact calibration of the reform and to the balance sheet structure of the euro area system.
Moreover, the more is silent on the steady-state and cyclical beneﬁts of higher capital requirements.
The ﬁrst set of simulations is conducted using the version of the model with endogenous defaults of
households and ﬁrms (Chart 31) whereas a second set of simulations is based on the model with bind-
ing collateral constraints (see Chart 32). Note that both models share to a large extent some common
speciﬁcations but they have been estimated on euro area data separately and therefore have different
deep parameter values. As regards the timing of the introduction of the higher capital requirements,
the experiments assume the implementation of higher capital requirements at different horizons (i.e.
immediate implementation, after two, four and six years, respectively). The model is run under per-
fect foresight and with endogenous monetary policy, following the estimated Taylor rule. Given the
speciﬁcation of the bank capital frictions and the calibration strategy for the steady state, capital re-
quirements have no tangible impact on the real allocation over the long term. As described above, the
required bank balance sheet adjustments take place through higher loan-deposit margins, which curb
loan demand and support the internal capital accumulation through higher retained earnings.
The parameterdriving the bank capitalchannel has been set at its highest value found across the various
estimation exercises (χwb =5 0 ). We also experimented with simulations through unexpected capital
requirement shocks. This led to somewhat stronger effects which could even be more pronounced by
assuming unchanged monetary policy. On balance, the perfect foresight simulations presented below
may be seen as the mid-range effects given possible assumptions on expectations and monetary policy
reaction.
We analyze ﬁrst the simulations from the model with endogenous defaults. In the case of immediate
implementation of higher capital requirements (blue lines in Chart 31), the maximum impact on real
GDP is obtained after several quarters. A 2 p.p. increase in capital requirements leads to a peak decline
in real GDP of 0.3 p.p., the negative effects being rapidly re-absorbedover the medium term. The down-
ward pressures on inﬂation are relatively short-lived, reaching -0.05 p.p. of quarterly inﬂation after few
quarters then reverting back to positive territory. As mentioned before, in the long-term, the transi-
tion towards higher capital requirements leave the real economy and the outstanding amount of loans
unchanged since the adjustment will be fully reﬂected in higher bank capital. The required increase
in bank proﬁts depends on the magnitude of loan-deposit margins’ increase compared with loan vol-
ume contraction. Chart 13 shows the hump-shaped responses of spreads and loans with opposite signs.
Given the more gradual interest rate pass-through on mortgage lending rates, the price and volume
adjustments of household credit are more sluggish than in the case of non-ﬁnancial corporations.
Considering now the announcement of higher capital requirements at distant horizons (other lines in
Charts 31), it turns out that the output cost of bank balance sheet consolidation becomes smaller, the
later the implementation date. For implementation in 2012, the peak negative impact on GDP is much
more moderate and materializes later than in the previous case. The transition path of GDP even turns
positive when higher capital requirements are expected to be implemented in 2014. In the latter case,
GDP only falls below baseline around the year of the implementation. The expansion of GDP in the ﬁrst
years is notably supported by lower bank lending rate spreads. The more benign impact on activity the
further into the future the actual implementation of the new requirements is moved can be interpreted
as a “smoothing out” of the negative implications of the capital shock. If banks have more time to adjust
their activities and balance sheets to the new environment they will tend to smooth the impact of the38
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shock. In other words, the tighter the implementation schedule, the more important will non-linearities
in credit frictions be.
The simulations conducted using the model with binding collateral constraints share some qualitative
similarities with the previous experiments. First, assuming an immediate implementation of higher
capital requirements (blue lines in Chart 32), the contraction of output reaches a peak effect of 0.35 p.p.
after more than one year. Compared with the model with endogenous defaults, the adverse impact
on activity is more persistent as GDP remains 0.15 p.p. below baseline at the end of the simulation
horizon. The negative effect on inﬂation peaks at less than 0.05 p.p. in the ﬁrst year. Turning now to the
delayed implementation period (other lines in Chart 32), which is perfectly anticipated by all agents, the
simulations show that the adverse implications for the economy would be limited by putting forward
by few years and credibly communicating future regulatory changes. This result is common to both
model speciﬁcations.
Nonetheless, in the model with binding collateral constraints, the mitigation of the adverse transitional
effects due to the implementation delay is weaker than in the model with endogenous defaults. In
particular, the announcement of higher capital requirements in 2012 still implies a decline in real GDP
of around 0.25 p.p. at the peak in 2013. Another difference with the previous model regards the price
and volume adjustments in credit markets. The model with binding collateral constraints leads to a
more pronounced contraction in loans and to higher lending rates.
6.3 Accounting for counter cyclical macroprudential policies
A ﬁnal application of the model is devoted to the interactions between monetary policy and macro-
prudential policy. In particular, we want to assess whether a counter-cyclical regulatory regime would
support macroeconomic stabilization. Recent papers like Kannan et al. [2009]o rAngeloni and Faia
[2009] have investigated this issue with different formulation of the strategic interactions between mon-
etary policy and macro-prudential policy. Here we focus on the joint determination of the two policy
rules as to maximize an ad hoc loss function under credible commitment.
The intertemporal quadratic loss function penalizes deviations from steady state for consumer price
inﬂation, output growth and policy rate. Monetary policy conduct is described as an interest rate rule
while macro-prudential policy is assumed to follow a capital requirement rule. Both rules feature pol-
icy inertia and respond to level and ﬁrst difference of consumer inﬂation, detrended output, and ﬁrst
difference of loans to households, loans to entrepreneurs, real housing prices and real equity prices
38. We chose to limit the analysis to a stylized loss function instead of a welfare-based objective as the
"reduced-form" nature of the bank capital frictionc o n s i d e r e di nt h i sp a p e rw o u l dw e a k l yp o r t r a yt h e
welfaretrade-offsfacedby macro-prudentialpolicy in particular. Consequently, we preferredto abstract
from welfare calculations and gear the policy discussion towards general macroeconomic stabilization
without investigating how the micro-foundations of the model inﬂuence the policy objectives.
The loss function considered can be written as follows:
Lt = λππ
2





where λπ, λz and λr are the coefﬁcients weighting the respective costs of volatility in CPI inﬂation,
38real equity prices are deﬁned as the average real price of ﬁxed capital in the economy39
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changes in output and nominal interest rate. Later on, we would consider introducing a penalty for
bank leverage volatility.
The weights in the loss function are selected in the following way. The monetary policy rule has the
same form as the estimated one. The exogenous processes for the structural shocks are taken from the
benchmark estimation. Then we search for the weighting scheme which delivers at the optimal rule, the
same volatility for inﬂation and policy rate as under the estimated rule. The optimal weights we obtain
are λπ =1 , λz =4and λr =0 .75. Such a loss function constitutes an intuitive benchmark. Another
possibility would have been to consider the full efﬁciency curve in the inﬂation, output growth space.
But, for the sake of clarity, we kept only one speciﬁc loss function. The essence of the results presented
thereafter holds for any point of this efﬁciency curve.
A ﬁrst exercise consists in optimizing the parameters of the monetary policy rule augmented with asset
prices and credit variables, keeping capital requirements constant. We concentrate on the following
formulation of the monetary policy rule.
rt = ρrt−1 +( 1− ρ)(rππt−1 + ryyt−1)+rΔπΔπt + rΔyΔyt
+rTDΔtD,t + rQΔqt + rhΔbHH,t + reΔbE,t
We only consider ﬁnancial shocks, as provided by the benchmark estimation: those disturbances re-
late to interest rate markups, borrowers ’ risk, bank capital and housing preference (also introduced its
contribution to housing prices). Focusing on economic disturbances at the core of credit intermediation
enables us to present more striking results on the role of credit and asset prices for monetary policy
conduct in interaction with a counter-cyclical regulatory framework. As sensitivity analysis (not pre-
sented here), we veriﬁed that the ﬁndings exposed thereafter were still holding when all shocks were
introduced.
Table 8 presents the macroeconomic volatilities associated with various optimized rules in the presence
of ﬁnancial shocks (except for the ﬁrst column). In the ﬁrst two columns, the monetary policy rule
is speciﬁed as in the estimation and optimized under constant capital requirements. For the sake of
completeness, the exercise is conducted either with ﬁnancial shocks or with the overall set of economic
disturbances. In both cases, the optimized monetary policy rule features a high level of interest rate
inertia, a strong long-term response to inﬂation, stronger reaction to changes in output than in its level,
and a speciﬁc role for housing prices. The restriction to ﬁnancial shocks seems to increase the coefﬁcient
on housing prices and output growth but does not change qualitatively the main properties on the
monetary policy rule. The macroeconomic variances generated by this monetary policy rule are taken
as benchmark to normalize the moments obtained with the other policy regimes in Table 8.
In the third column, we allow for monetary policy reaction to credit and equity prices. The augmented
optimal rule improves upon the previous one, reducing the loss function from 0.34 to 0.23. However,
the lower volatility obtained for output growth and the interest rate is counterbalanced by a higher
standard deviation for inﬂation. This optimal rule still displays a high degree of interest rate inertia, a
strong reaction to inﬂation and some speciﬁc role for housing prices. But in addition, the rule include
some positive response to household loans whereas the coefﬁcients on loans to entrepreneurs and real
equity prices are close to zero. Even without introducing asset prices or credit in the objective function,
it turns out that the ﬁnancial frictions on the household side vindicate some speciﬁc monetary policy
focus on credit and asset prices.40
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With the augmented monetary policy rule speciﬁcation, we also investigated the implications of risk-
sensitive capital requirements. In this case, the optimized coefﬁcients remain very close to the ones
obtained with constant capital requirements (see column 4 in Table 8). At the margin, the monetary
policy response to housing prices and household loans turns out to be stronger.
In the last two columns of Table 8, we allow for time-varying capital requirements. We assume that the
target bank capital ratio follows a log-linear rule of the form
capt = ρbccapt−1 + rbc







Keeping the same loss function as in the previous experiments, the joint optimal determination of policy
rules suggests that counter-cyclical regulation could provide a strong support to macroeconomic stabi-
lization. The optimized capital requirement rule features some inertia and a very high positive response
to output while the role for credit variables and asset prices seems negligible. The optimized monetary
policy rule is very much affected by the introduction of counter-cyclical regulation: in particular, all
coefﬁcients on credit and asset prices become insigniﬁcant. Acting at the core of the ﬁnancial system,
regulatory policy seems to be relatively more effective than monetary policy in addressing destabilizing
ﬂuctuations in credit markets and intratemporal wedges between ﬁnancial costs, therefore alleviating
somehow the need for monetary policy to "lean against the wind". The jointly determined policy rules
deliver a superior macroeconomic outcome. The loss function gets close to zero, with output growth
volatility at 16.5% of the benchmark, inﬂation volatility at 70% and interest rate at 30%. However, in the
model, the main transmission channel of regulatory policy on the economy works through the adjust-
ment of bank balance sheets and its impact on bank lending rates. Consequently, the macroeconomic
stabilization support from the optimized capital requirement rule implies an almost ﬁvefold increase in
bank leverage volatility. Such a degree of counter-cyclical capital requirements would therefore be dif-
ﬁcult to implement and lead to excessive volatility in bank balance sheets. As shown in the last column
of Table 8, if we constrain the regulatory framework by introducing a relatively small penalty for lever-
age volatility in the loss function, then the optimized capital requirement rule becomes only moderately
time-varying and the monetary policy rule is very similar to the one obtained under constant capital
requirements.
Overall, while some counter-cyclical regulation seems suitable as far as macroeconomic stabilization
is concerned, its design and magnitude should be carefully considered. The analysis presented here
remains illustrative and subject to clear limitations. Notably, a structural interpretation of systemic risk
(and in particular its cross-sectional dimension) is absent from the model. Such a concept is essential to
deﬁne a meaningful objective for macro-prudential policy.
7 Conclusions
The recent years’ dramatic events which brought ﬁnancial markets into turmoil highlighted the crucial
role of credit market frictions in the propagation of economic and ﬁnancial shocks. However, the nature
of banking and the role of banks in amplifying macroeconomic ﬂuctuations are elements have hith-
erto been largely neglected in the macroeconomic literature and, in particular, in the design of general41
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equilibrium models. To reﬂect this, a number of recent papers try to correct this void by incorporating
banking sectors and other ﬁnancial frictions into DSGE modeling frameworks. The model presented in
this paper contributes to this research by incorporating a number of demand and supply credit frictions
into an estimated DSGE model of the euro area.
Apart from documenting the potential amplifying effects of credit frictions, this setup allows us to
analyze changes in the regulatory regimes facing the ﬁnancial sector, such as the introduction of risk
sensitive capital requirements or the transition towards more stringent regulatory regimes. Moreover,
reﬂecting the renewed focus on the nexus between monetary policy and macro-prudential (or ﬁnancial
stability-oriented) policies, our results point to important complementarities.
Finally, a few caveats and directions for further research should be mentioned. First of all, the banking
sector in our setup is of a reduced form nature and can be further improved. For example, a more
complete description of the balance sheet composition of the banks taking into account issues such
as liquidity, wholesale funding and trading book valuations would enhance the speciﬁcation and also
allow for analyzing the macroeconomic impact of money market disruptions, bank liquidity positions
and unconventional monetary policies. Likewise, a more micro-founded optimization of the policy rule
to study the interactions between macro-prudential and monetary policies could be pursued.42
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A Supplementary model description
A.1 The borrower’s program
Let us deﬁne
H( )=( 1 −N cdf(log( )/σHH +0 .5σHH))  + Ncdf(log( )/σHH − 0.5σHH) (1)
G( )=( 1 −N cdf(log( )/σHH +0 .5σHH))  +( 1− μHH)Ncdf(log( )/σHH − 0.5σHH) (2)
Y( )=( 1 −N cdf(log( )/σHH +0 .5σHH))/(1 −N cdf(log( )/σHH +0 .5σHH) − μHH f( )) (3)
where Ncdf is the normal cumulative distribution, centered and standardized.
We denote   Λt and   ΛtΨt the lagrange multipliers associated with the budget constraint of impatient
households and the participation constraints for the commercial lending branches
  Ct +   QD,tTD,t   Dt + H( HH,t)(1 − χHH)QD,tTD,t(1 − δ)   Db
t−1
=( 1 − δ)   QD,tTD,t   Dt−1 + BHH,t +   TTt + WC,tNC,t + WD,tND,t (4)





  U X,t = ε
β
t   Xt
−σC (6)
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  Ct+1 − hB   Ct
 − 1
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ηD















  U X,t (8)
The maximization of household welfare with respect to the default threshold  HH,t implies after some
manipulations
Ψt = Y( HH,t) (9)
The ﬁrst order condition related to non-residential consumption and residential stock are respectively,
  Λt =   U C,t (10)
and
  Λt   QD,tTD,t −   U D,t − β (1 − δ)Et
 
  Λt+1   QD,t+1TD,t+1
 
= β (1 − δ)Et
 
  Λt+1   QD,t+1TD,t+1 (1 − χ)(G( HH,t+1)Ψt+1 − H( HH,t+1))
 
(11)
Finally, the optimality condition regarding the loan decision gives a "modiﬁed" version of the standard
Euler equation
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Note that Y( HH,t+1) plays the role of spread on the real interest rate which drives the intertemporal
consumption smoothing. The spread between the lending rate in the optimal credit contract and the
















t +( 1− ωr)Λ o
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A.2 The saver’s program
Let us denote






































ηD U  X,t+1
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U  X,t (16)
The ﬁrst order condition related to non-residential consumption and residential stock are respectively,
Λt = U  C,t (17)
and
ΛtQD,tTD,t = U  D,t + γ (1 − δ)Et {Λt+1QD,t+1TD,t+1} (18)
where Λt is the multiplier associated with the budget constraint.
A.3 Labor supply and wage setting







































































































with βi = β if i = S and βi = γ if i = B.A l s o ,W r
j,i,t denotes the real wage of type i in sector j and Λit
is the marginal utility of consumption of type i.
The dynamics of wage dispersion per sector j and per household type i can be written as:
Δw






































HE( E)=( 1 −N cdf(log( E)/σE +0 .5σE)) E + Ncdf(log( E)/σE − 0.5σE) (23)
GE( E)=( 1 −N cdf(log( E)/σE +0 .5σE)) E +( 1− μE)Ncdf(log( E)/σE − 0.5σE) (24)
YE( E)=( 1 −N cdf(log( E)/σE +0 .5σE))/(1 −N cdf(log( E)/σE +0 .5σE) − μE f( E))(25)
where Ncdf is the normal cumulative distribution, centered and standardized.
We denote ΛE,t and ΛE,tΨE,t the lagrange multipliers associated with the budget constraint of en-




t − (1 − δK)KC
t−1)+QD
t (KD
t − (1 − δK)KD
t−1)+HE( E,t) ˜ AE,t
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t as the apparent return on ﬁxed capital for sector C and D.50
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1 − αD − αL
(32)



















































The ﬁrst order condition related to non-residential consumption gives,
ΛE,t =   U C,t (36)
The maximization of entrepreneur welfare with respect to the default threshold  E,t implies after some
manipulations
ΨE,t = YE( E,t) (37)










Note that YE( E,t+1) plays the role of spread on the real interest rate which drives the intertemporal
consumption smoothing of entrepreneurs. The spread between the lending rate in the optimal credit
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A.5 Bank lending rate setting
The imperfect pass-through of market interest rates on bank lending and deposit rates is described in
the recursive formulation of the staggered interest rate setting on savers ’ deposits and on funding costs
of the commercial lending banks.
The following equations determines the average interest rate RHH,t applied to funds provided by the


































































Similarly, the average interest rate charged to the commercial lending branches specialized in loans to
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A.6 Price setting in the retail and distribution sector
The price setting in the retail and distribution non-residential sector leads to the following recursive
formulation which implicitly determines the inﬂation rate Πt:
















































t represents a stationary cost-push shock.
Similarly the recursive form related the price setting in the residential sectors follows














































Price dispersion indexes are then given by
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A.7 Capital and Housing stock producers
Given the accumulation processes
KC
















































the ﬁrst order conditions for the capital and housing stock producers are
















































































































































































B Predetermined lending rates
We assume now that the commercial lending branches propose credit contract where the lending rate is
not contingent on the realization of aggregate uncertainty.
B.1 Entrepreneurs
As in the benchmark case, entrepreneurs’ ﬁxed capital are subject to common multiplicative idiosyn-
cratic shocks  E,t. As for households, these shocks are independent and identically distributed across
time and across entrepreneurs with E( E,t)=1 , and a lognormal CDF F E( E,t). Here again, the
variance of the idiosyncratic shock σE,t is time-varying.
As for borrowers, entrepreneurs only use debt contracts in which the loan rates can be made contingent
on aggregate shocks but not on the idiosyncratic shock  E,t. Entrepreneurs belong to a large family
that can diversify the idiosyncratic risk after loan contracts are settled, but cannot commit to sharing
the proceeds of this insurance with banks. Banks can seize collateral  E,t ˜ AE,t when the entrepreneur
refuses to pay at a cost of μE E,t ˜ AE,t. The value of the collateral that the bank can seize is





Before the realization of aggregate uncertainty in period , there exists a cut-off point  E,t on the realiza-
tion of the idiosyncratic shock below which the entrepreneur chooses to default. This threshold veriﬁes
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For the bank to participate in the credit contract, the ex ante proﬁt must be positive








≥ (1 + RE,t)BE,t
with
GE( E,t)=( 1− F E
t ( E,t)) E,t +( 1− μE)




Once the aggregate uncertainty resolves, the ex post cut-off point  B





BE,t−1 =  B












































































































t , E,t,L C,t,L D,t)
subject to an inﬁnite sequence of budget constraints and participation constraints for the commercial
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We focus thereafter on the ﬁrst order conditions changing with respect to the benchmark case.



























The optimality condition regarding the loan decision implies
1=βE  ΨE,t(1 + RE,t) (72)
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− μHH HH,t−1f( HH,t−1)
(78)
Each borrower maximizes its utility function with respect to (   Ct,   Dt,B HH,t, HH,t,N C,t,N D,t) under
the inﬁnite sequence of budget constraint for impatient households and the participation constraints for
the commercial lending branches. We denote   Λt and β  Λt  Ψt the lagrange multipliers associated with the
respective constraints
  Ct +   QD,tTD,t   Dt +( 1− χHH)(1 − δ)   HD( HH,t−1, B
HH,t)
=( 1 − δ)   QD,tTD,t   Dt−1 + BHH,t +   TTt + WC,tNC,t + WD,tND,t (79)
G( HH,t)(1 − χHH)(1 − δ)Et
 
  QD,t+1TD,t+1   Dt (1 + πt+1)
 
=( 1+RHH,t)BHH,t (80)
substituting out for the ex post default threshold using
 B
HH,t   QD,tTD,t   Dt−1 =  HH,t−1
Et−1
 




We focus thereafter on the ﬁrst order conditions changing with respect to the benchmark case.
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The optimality condition regarding the loan decision implies
1=β  Ψt (1 + RHH,t) (83)
The ﬁrst order condition related to non-residential consumption and residential stock are respectively,
  Λt =   U C,t (84)
and
  Λt   QD,tTD,t −   U D,t − β (1 − δ)Et
 
  Λt+1   QD,t+1TD,t+1
 
= β (1 − δ)(1− χ)Et
 
  Λt   QD,t+1TD,t+1G( HH,t+1)  Ψt (1 + πt+1)











B.3 Proﬁt accumulation in the banking system
With pre-determinedlending rates, the differencebetweenex ante and ex post default rateshas animpact
on the proﬁts generated by the banking group as follows
Πb











HH,t)(1 − χHH)(1 − δ)   QD,tTD,t   Dt (1 + πt)
−ωG( HH,t−1)(1 − χHH)(1 − δ)Et−1
 
  QD,tTD,t   Dt−1 (1 + πt)
 
+GE( B


















C Binding collateral constraints
We consider a speciﬁcation of the credit frictions which does not allow for strategic default and which
consists in constraining the amount of new loans by the value of the available collateral. The modelling
strategy using collateral constraints is similar to Gerali et al. [2009].
C.1 Entrepreneurs
We remove the presence of idiosyncratic risk on the assets of entrepreneurs and therefore we do not
consider the possibility of strategic default. Instead, we assume that all the entrepreneurs have limited
access to credit markets, as summarized by the following (nominal) collateral constraint:








  (1 + πt+1)
(1 + RE,t)
 
Entrepreneurs do not default on their loans and in equilibrium the collateral constraint is binding.58
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Compared with the benchmark case, there is no spread between the lending rate and the ﬁnancing rate
for the commercial lending bank
RL
E,t = RE,t (86)






t ,L C,t,L D,t)
subject to an inﬁnite sequence of budget constraints and collateral constraints. We denote ΛE,t and























































We focus thereafter on the ﬁrst order conditions changing with respect to the benchmark case.
The optimality condition regarding the loan decision implies






















































Given the absence of idiosyncratic risks and defaults, each borrower maximizes its utility function
with respect to (   Ct,   Dt,B HH,t,N C,t,N D,t) under the inﬁnite sequence of budget constraint for impa-
tient households and the participation constraints for the commercial lending branches. We denote   Λt
and β  Λt  Ψt the lagrange multipliers associated with the respective constraints
  Ct +   QD,tTD,t
 






= BHH,t +   TTt + WC,tNC,t + WD,tND,t (92)
BHH,t =( 1− χHH)(1 − δ)Et
 









HH,t = RHH,t (94)59
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We focus thereafter on the ﬁrst order conditions changing with respect to the benchmark case.
The optimality condition regarding the loan decision implies








The ﬁrst order condition related to residential stock is,
  Λt   QD,tTD,t −   U D,t − β (1 − δ)Et
 
  Λt+1   QD,t+1TD,t+1
 
= β (1 − δ)(1− χ)   ΨtEt
 
  QD,t+1TD,t+1 (1 + πt+1)
 
(96)
DD a t a
Data for GDP, consumption, investment, employment, wages and consumption-deﬂator are taken from
Fagan et al (2001) and Eurostat. Employment numbers replace hours. Consequently, as in Smets and
Wouters [2005], hours are linked to the number of people employed e∗













House prices for the euro area are based on national sources and taken from the ECB website39.R e s -
idential investment is taken from Eurostat national accounts and is backdated using national sources.
Households’ debt for the euro area also comes from the ECB and Eurostat40 The 3-month money market
rate is the 3-month Euribor taken from the ECB web s i t ea n dw eu s eb a c k d a t e ds e r i e sf o rt h ep e r i o d
prior to 1999 based on national data sources. Household deposits are proxied using a backdated series
of M2 which is available from the ECB website and which represent the main part of deposits held with
MFIs by euro area non-ﬁnancial private sector residents (households primarily). Data on MFI loans
to households and non-ﬁnancial corporations are likewise taken from the ECB website. Data prior to
September 1997 have been backdated based on national sources. Meanwhile, data on retail bank loan
and deposit rates are based on ofﬁcial ECB statistics from January2003onwards and on ECB internal es-
timates based on national sources in the period before. The lending rates refer to new business rates on
loans to households for house purchase and new business rates on loans to non-ﬁnancial corporations,
excluding bank overdrafts. For the period prior to January 2003the euro areaaggregateseries have been
weighted using corresponding loan volumes (outstanding amounts) by country. Deposit rates refer to
MFI interest rates on time deposits with agreed maturity taken from households. Similar to the deriva-
tion of the loan rates, from January 2003 deposit rates are based on ofﬁcial ECB statistics and prior to
this period are based on a volume-weighted average of country-based rates.
39we applied some statistical interpolation methods to generate quarterly series
40See ECB Monthly Bulletin, October 2007, for the description of the data used60
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Tab. 1: PARAMETER ESTIMATES 1
State-contingent lending rates pre-determined lending rates
Param Ap r i o r ibeliefs A posteriori beliefs A posteriori beliefs
Dist. Mean Std. Mode Mean I1 I2 Mode Mean I1 I2
ε
A
t unif 5 2.89 0.49 0.50 0.42 0.58 0.51 0.54 0.44 0.64
ε
I
t unif 5 2.89 0.26 0.27 0.20 0.34 0.29 0.30 0.20 0.40
ε
L
t unif 5 2.89 0.17 0.18 0.13 0.23 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.22
ε
G
t unif 5 2.89 1.85 1.87 1.64 2.12 1.93 1.96 1.72 2.20
ε
B
t unif 5 2.89 1.44 1.50 1.24 1.77 1.54 1.77 1.31 2.21
ε
AD
t unif 5 2.89 2.09 2.15 1.52 2.75 0.80 0.83 0.71 0.95
ε
D
t unif 5 2.89 2.04 2.47 1.21 3.72 0.95 1.00 0.73 1.27
ε
P
t unif 5 2.89 0.28 0.30 0.25 0.35 0.23 0.24 0.20 0.27
ε
R
D,t unif 5 2.89 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.09
ε
R
HH,t unif 5 2.89 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.09
ε
R
E,t unif 5 2.89 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.23 0.24 0.20 0.28
ε
σ
HH,t unif 5 2.89 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.09
ε
σ
E,t unif 5 2.89 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.10
ε
Bankcap
t unif 5 2.89 2.32 2.37 2.06 2.66 2.44 2.51 2.18 2.83
ε
R
t unif 5 2.89 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.16
ρA beta 0.5 0.2 0.92 0.90 0.85 0.95 0.90 0.88 0.84 0.92
ρI beta 0.5 0.2 0.68 0.68 0.58 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.60 0.84
ρl beta 0.5 0.2 0.85 0.83 0.73 0.93 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.15
ρG beta 0.5 0.2 0.91 0.88 0.79 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.99
ρB beta 0.5 0.2 0.95 0.94 0.91 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.99
ρAD beta 0.5 0.2 0.89 0.88 0.83 0.94 0.98 0.94 0.90 0.99
ρD beta 0.5 0.2 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99
ρ
R
D,t beta 0.5 0.2 0.97 0.96 0.93 0.99 0.94 0.94 0.91 0.96
ρ
R
HH,t beta 0.5 0.2 0.26 0.26 0.13 0.38 0.17 0.17 0.06 0.28
ρ
R
E,t beta 0.5 0.2 0.40 0.41 0.23 0.57 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.16
ρ
σ
HH,t beta 0.5 0.2 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.95 0.95 0.92 0.98
ρ
σ
E,t beta 0.5 0.2 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.99
ρ
Bankcap
t beta 0.5 0.2 0.71 0.70 0.61 0.79 0.60 0.58 0.49 0.6861
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Tab. 2: PARAMETER ESTIMATES 2
State-contingent lending rates pre-determined lending rates
Param Ap r i o r ibeliefs A posteriori beliefs A posteriori beliefs
Dist. Mean Std. Mode Mean I1 I2 Mode Mean I1 I2
φD gamm 1 0.5 0.23 0.23 0.15 0.31 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
φ norm 4 1.5 7.72 7.71 5.63 9.74 7.89 7.92 5.73 9.91
ϕ beta 0.5 0.15 0.75 0.76 0.63 0.89 0.84 0.84 0.75 0.94
σX gamm 1.5 0.20 0.63 0.65 0.56 0.73 1.29 1.26 1.03 1.48
h beta 0.75 0.1 0.59 0.58 0.54 0.62 0.37 0.37 0.28 0.46
σL gamm 1.5 0.1 1.32 1.33 1.18 1.47 1.48 1.48 1.32 1.64
αwC beta 0.85 0.05 0.73 0.73 0.67 0.80 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.95
αwD beta 0.85 0.05 0.87 0.85 0.79 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.89 0.94
γw beta 0.5 0.15 0.24 0.28 0.10 0.44 0.17 0.20 0.07 0.33
ξC beta 0.75 0.05 0.83 0.83 0.79 0.86 0.90 0.90 0.87 0.92
γC beta 0.5 0.15 0.58 0.61 0.45 0.78 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.12
ξD beta 0.2 0.1 0.81 0.81 0.76 0.86 0.17 0.25 0.06 0.43
ξ
R
D beta 0.5 0.2 0.32 0.31 0.26 0.37 0.28 0.29 0.22 0.35
ξ
R
HH beta 0.5 0.2 0.92 0.92 0.88 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.95
ξ
R
E beta 0.5 0.2 0.76 0.75 0.69 0.82 0.80 0.78 0.72 0.84
χwb gamm 20 2.5 18.58 18.54 15.08 22.03 17.91 17.90 14.34 21.34
ρ beta 0.75 0.1 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.87 0.89 0.90 0.87 0.93
rπ gamm 2.5 0.25 2.37 2.38 2.17 2.59 1.80 1.85 1.68 2.02
ry gamm 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.12
rΔπ gamm 0.30 0.10 0.24 0.24 0.18 0.31 0.21 0.20 0.14 0.27
rΔy gamm 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.21
rTD norm 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.15
λe beta 0.75 0.05 0.65 0.65 0.61 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.64 0.73
Pλ(Y) -432.1 -579.362
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Tab. 3: PARAMETER ESTIMATES:D S G EWITH BINDING COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS
Param Ap r i o r ibeliefs A posteriori beliefs Ap r i o r ibeliefs A posteriori beliefs
Mean Dist. Std. Mode I1 I2 Mean Dist. Std. Mode I1 I2
ε
A
t unif 5 2.89 0.42 0.37 0.51 φD -- - ---
ε
I
t invg 5 2.89 0.19 0.17 0.24 φ norm 4 1.5 6.18 4.72 7.89
ε
L
t unif 5 2.89 0.18 0.11 0.25 ϕ beta 0.5 0.15 0.83 0.76 0.95
ε
G
t unif 5 2.89 1.95 1.69 2.17 σX gamm 1.5 0.20 0.85 0.57 0.92
ε
B
t invg 5 2.89 1.12 0.83 1.48 h beta 0.7 0.05 0.44 0.40 0.52
ε
AD
t unif 5 2.89 0.82 0.71 0.96 σL gamm 1.5 0.1 1.40 1.25 1.56
ε
D
t invg 5 2.89 0.96 0.84 1.68 αwC beta 0.85 0.05 0.70 0.63 0.91
ε
P
t unif 5 2.89 0.25 0.23 0.32 αwD beta 0.85 0.05 0.87 0.74 0.93
ε
R
D,t invg 5 2.89 0.06 0.04 0.08 γw beta 0.5 0.15 0.19 0.08 0.41
ε
R
HH,t invg 5 2.89 0.05 0.04 0.06 ξC beta 0.75 0.05 0.85 0.81 0.88
ε
R
E,t invg 5 2.89 0.06 0.05 0.08 γC beta 0.5 0.15 0.39 0.31 0.62
ε
LTV
HH,t invg 5 2.89 0.87 0.78 1.04 ξD beta 0.2 0.1 0.13 0.04 0.29
ε
LTV
E,t invg 5 2.89 0.12 0.10 0.14 ξ
R
D beta 0.5 0.1 0.30 0.26 0.36
ε
Bankcap
t unif 5 2.89 2.49 2.23 2.87 ξ
R
HH beta 0.5 0.1 0.91 0.88 0.93
ε
R
t unif 5 2.89 0.11 0.10 0.13 ξ
R
E beta 0.5 0.1 0.53 0.47 0.62
χwb gamm 20 2.5 11.94 9.69 14.27
ρ beta 0.75 0.1 0.82 0.79 0.85
ρA beta 0.5 0.2 0.95 0.90 0.97 rπ gamm 2.5 0.25 2.08 1.95 2.37
ρI beta 0.5 0.2 0.39 0.32 0.57 ry -- - ---
ρl beta 0.5 0.2 0.93 0.38 0.98 rΔπ gamm 0.3 0.10 0.29 0.22 0.37
ρG beta 0.5 0.2 0.99 0.92 1.00 rΔy gamm 0.12 0.05 0.14 0.10 0.18
ρB beta 0.5 0.2 0.96 0.93 0.97 rTD -- - ---
ρAD beta 0.5 0.2 0.98 0.90 0.99 λe beta 0.75 0.05 0.65 0.60 0.70
ρD beta 0.5 0.175 0.99 0.98 0.99
ρ
R
D,t beta 0.5 0.2 0.94 0.90 0.52
ρ
R
HH,t beta 0.5 0.2 0.40 0.28 0.52
ρ
R
E,t beta 0.5 0.2 0.94 0.88 0.97
ρ
LTV
HH,t beta 0.5 0.2 0.99 0.98 0.99
ρ
LTV
E,t beta 0.5 0.2 0.99 0.98 0.99
ρ
Bankcap
t beta 0.5 0.2 0.65 0.55 0.97
Pλ(Y) -650.063
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Tab. 4: PARAMETER ESTIMATES: INTRODUCING CORRELATIONS WITH THE HOUSING SHOCK 1
State-contingent lending rates pre-determined lending rates
Param Ap r i o r ibeliefs A posteriori beliefs A posteriori beliefs
Dist. Mean Std. Mode Mean I1 I2 Mode Mean I1 I2
ε
A
t unif 5 2.89 0.45 0.46 0.39 0.53 0.60 0.60 0.48 0.73
ε
I
t unif 5 2.89 0.26 0.28 0.20 0.35 0.28 0.29 0.21 0.37
ε
L
t unif 5 2.89 0.18 0.19 0.15 0.24 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.20
ε
G
t unif 5 2.89 1.88 1.92 1.68 2.16 1.97 1.97 1.71 2.21
ε
B
t unif 5 2.89 2.05 2.02 1.57 2.45 2.51 2.51 1.60 3.45
ε
AD
t unif 5 2.89 2.08 2.10 1.50 2.65 1.63 1.63 1.02 2.24
ε
D
t unif 5 2.89 2.77 2.95 1.72 4.10 1.79 1.79 0.88 2.74
ε
P
t unif 5 2.89 0.28 0.29 0.25 0.34 0.22 0.23 0.20 0.26
ε
R
D,t unif 5 2.89 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05
ε
R
HH,t unif 5 2.89 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.10
ε
R
E,t unif 5 2.89 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.24 0.25 0.21 0.29
ε
σ
HH,t unif 5 2.89 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.11
ε
σ
E,t unif 5 2.89 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.10
ε
Bankcap
t unif 5 2.89 2.30 2.35 2.06 2.65 2.64 2.64 2.29 2.98
ε
R
t unif 5 2.89 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.12
ρA beta 0.5 0.2 0.97 0.96 0.93 0.98 0.87 0.86 0.82 0.90
ρI beta 0.5 0.2 0.69 0.68 0.58 0.79 0.69 0.69 0.57 0.80
ρl beta 0.5 0.2 0.79 0.60 0.27 0.89 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.16
ρG beta 0.5 0.2 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.90 0.99
ρB beta 0.5 0.2 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.99
ρAD beta 0.5 0.2 0.90 0.89 0.84 0.93 0.87 0.88 0.81 0.94
ρD beta 0.5 0.2 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.99
ρ
R
D,t beta 0.5 0.2 0.95 0.95 0.92 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.90 0.98
ρ
R
HH,t beta 0.5 0.2 0.25 0.25 0.14 0.37 0.11 0.11 0.02 0.19
ρ
R
E,t beta 0.5 0.2 0.37 0.37 0.22 0.52 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.16
ρ
σ
HH,t beta 0.5 0.2 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.99
ρ
σ
E,t beta 0.5 0.2 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.99
ρ
Bankcap
t beta 0.5 0.2 0.72 0.71 0.62 0.80 0.57 0.57 0.47 0.6764
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Tab. 5: PARAMETER ESTIMATES: INTRODUCING CORRELATIONS WITH THE HOUSING SHOCK 2
State-contingent lending rates pre-determined lending rates
Param Ap r i o r ibeliefs A posteriori beliefs A posteriori beliefs
Dist. Mean Std. Mode Mean I1 I2 Mode Mean I1 I2
φD gamm 1 0.5 0.23 0.22 0.15 0.30 0.14 0.11 0.05 0.17
φ norm 4 1.5 7.52 7.66 5.54 9.79 7.73 7.73 5.73 9.74
ϕ beta 0.5 0.15 0.77 0.76 0.64 0.89 0.79 0.79 0.67 0.91
σX gamm 1.5 0.20 0.71 0.72 0.66 0.79 0.94 0.94 0.78 1.10
h beta 0.75 0.1 0.53 0.51 0.45 0.58 0.17 0.18 0.11 0.24
σL gamm 1.5 0.1 1.32 1.32 1.18 1.46 1.48 1.48 1.33 1.64
αwC beta 0.85 0.05 0.83 0.79 0.68 0.89 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.95
αwD beta 0.85 0.05 0.88 0.86 0.81 0.92 0.89 0.88 0.84 0.93
γw beta 0.5 0.15 0.19 0.26 0.09 0.43 0.20 0.21 0.07 0.33
ξC beta 0.75 0.05 0.84 0.85 0.81 0.88 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.93
γC beta 0.5 0.15 0.55 0.58 0.43 0.73 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.09
ξD beta 0.2 0.1 0.81 0.79 0.75 0.84 0.76 0.74 0.62 0.86
ξ
R
D beta 0.5 0.2 0.28 0.28 0.23 0.33 0.39 0.38 0.31 0.44
ξ
R
HH beta 0.5 0.2 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.94
ξ
R
E beta 0.5 0.2 0.77 0.76 0.70 0.82 0.78 0.78 0.72 0.83
χwb gamm 20 2.5 19.07 19.34 15.90 22.56 18.38 18.38 15.02 21.93
ρ beta 0.75 0.1 0.81 0.81 0.78 0.84 0.92 0.91 0.88 0.95
rπ gamm 2.5 0.25 2.36 2.41 2.22 2.60 2.23 2.23 1.88 2.55
ry gamm 0.2 0.1 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.23 0.24 0.10 0.38
rΔπ gamm 0.30 0.10 0.31 0.31 0.24 0.38 0.15 0.16 0.10 0.22
rΔy gamm 0.12 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.17
rTD norm 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.07
λe beta 0.75 0.05 0.64 0.63 0.58 0.67 0.73 0.72 0.68 0.76
ω beta 0.45 0.05 0.28 0.27 0.22 0.31 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.19
ρB,D unif 0.00 2.89 0.89 0.91 0.53 1.26 0.93 0.93 0.31 1.51
ρD,σHH gamm 1.00 0.50 1.78 1.76 1.20 2.33 1.13 1.13 0.32 1.89
Pλ(Y) -387.2 -553.165
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Estimation with state-contingent lending rates
Zt 3.1 19.1 14.9 3.5 1.2 0.1 8.2 0.7 49.1
C
tot
t 0.7 7.8 26.8 1.8 1.8 0.1 8.0 0.6 52.6
It 0.1 0.8 0.4 40.4 0.4 1.9 0.4 6.3 49.1
ZD,t 23.3 42.9 1.4 0.8 0.4 0.1 5.0 0.1 26.1
TD,t 3.6 36.5 1.3 3.0 0.0 0.1 1.2 0.5 53.9
L
tot
t 2.5 17.6 13.2 3.7 1.1 0.1 7.2 0.8 53.9
W
tot
t 0.5 4.3 16.0 1.2 1.1 0.0 6.9 0.4 69.7
Πt 0.2 1.2 7.6 3.6 0.4 0.1 8.3 0.8 77.9
Rt 0.1 10.9 12.6 8.5 0.9 0.2 13.4 1.8 51.7
RE,t 0.0 3.0 4.4 19.6 0.6 35.8 6.6 7.1 23.0
RHH,t 0.2 8.5 24.6 2.7 42.9 0.8 5.9 2.6 11.9
RD,t 0.1 11.6 14.4 10.5 0.9 0.3 4.7 2.2 55.4
BE,t 0.0 1.5 6.3 61.1 0.8 1.0 3.5 3.1 22.7
BHH,t 0.3 17.9 53.9 0.9 3.9 0.3 1.1 3.2 18.7
Dept 0.1 6.9 18.4 22.4 2.2 1.1 2.0 23.3 23.6
Estimation with pre-determined lending rates
Zt 1.9 1.9 1.7 26.8 0.2 0.8 7.1 0.7 58.9
C
tot
t 0.6 2.1 3.9 3.0 0.1 0.1 11.1 0.5 78.6
It 0.0 0.6 0.0 55.6 0.3 1.6 0.0 2.3 39.7
ZD,t 40.9 13.5 0.2 2.5 0.2 0.2 4.0 0.2 38.3
TD,t 5.2 36.5 0.3 4.5 0.4 0.3 9.0 0.3 43.5
L
tot
t 0.1 1.2 1.1 16.3 0.1 0.5 4.4 0.4 75.9
W
tot
t 0.0 0.4 0.1 2.4 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.1 96.0
Πt 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.0 95.9
Rt 0.0 12.6 2.8 24.9 0.3 0.5 23.1 0.5 35.3
RE,t 0.0 1.1 0.2 32.8 0.3 48.8 1.8 5.1 9.9
RHH,t 0.1 2.0 7.3 4.7 73.0 1.1 1.4 2.6 7.8
RD,t 0.0 12.2 2.4 35.3 0.3 0.6 1.4 0.7 47.0
BE,t 0.0 0.1 0.1 92.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 1.7 5.0
BHH,t 0.8 11.9 62.2 2.8 10.2 0.2 1.6 1.7 8.6
Dept 0.4 5.8 27.9 39.6 6.5 1.3 0.6 10.8 7.166
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Estimation with binding collateral constraints
Zt 1.5 1.3 0.2 4.3 0.5 0.7 6.6 0.4 84.5
C
tot
t 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.1 1.0 0.4 7.7 0.9 88.5
It 0.2 0.3 0.1 23.5 0.3 8.5 1.4 8.2 57.7
ZD,t 41.0 20.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 3.2 0.1 35.1
TD,t 5.2 45.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.1 4.4 0.1 43.8
L
tot
t 0.1 1.2 0.2 4.4 0.5 0.7 5.6 0.4 87.0
W
tot
t 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.7 0.1 5.9 0.1 91.3
Πt 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.8 7.6 0.1 89.9
Rt 0.5 0.8 0.6 3.6 1.5 2.9 18.0 0.9 71.3
RE,t 0.1 1.0 1.1 3.1 1.0 15.9 15.4 14.5 48.1
RHH,t 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 78.9 4.1 3.1 2.0 11.5
RD,t 0.4 0.8 0.7 3.7 2.0 4.1 4.5 1.2 82.6
BE,t 0.0 0.1 0.1 65.7 0.1 4.8 0.9 4.1 24.2
BHH,t 3.8 32.2 36.9 0.6 3.9 0.2 5.8 1.1 15.6
Dept 2.6 20.7 24.2 12.1 4.8 1.4 5.3 12.4 16.567
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Fig. 1: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on εA
t . Benchmark model (plain lines and shaded areas),
model with high bank capital channel (blue dotted lines with circle), model without imperfect interest rate pass-through (green
dotted lines), model with pre-determined lending rates (red dashed lines with cross).68
ECB


















































































































































































































































































Fig. 2: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on εI
t. Benchmark model (plain lines and shaded areas),
model with high bank capital channel (blue dotted lines with circle), model without imperfect interest rate pass-through (green
dotted lines), model with pre-determined lending rates (red dashed lines with cross).69
ECB







































































































































































































































































































Fig. 3: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on εL
t . Benchmark model (plain lines and shaded areas),
model with high bank capital channel (blue dotted lines with circle), model without imperfect interest rate pass-through (green
dotted lines), model with pre-determined lending rates (red dashed lines with cross).70
ECB




























































































































































































































































































Fig. 4: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on εG
t . Benchmark model (plain lines and shaded areas),
model with high bank capital channel (blue dotted lines with circle), model without imperfect interest rate pass-through (green
dotted lines), model with pre-determined lending rates (red dashed lines with cross).71
ECB





















































































































































































































































































Fig. 5: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on εB
t . Benchmark model (plain lines and shaded areas),
model with high bank capital channel (blue dotted lines with circle), model without imperfect interest rate pass-through (green
dotted lines), model with pre-determined lending rates (red dashed lines with cross).72
ECB




















































































































































































































































































Fig. 6: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on ε
AD
t . Benchmark model (plain lines and shaded
areas), model with high bank capital channel (blue dotted lines with circle), model without imperfect interest rate pass-through
(green dotted lines), model with pre-determined lending rates (red dashed lines with cross).73
ECB




































































































































































































































































































Fig. 7: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on εD
t . Benchmark model (plain lines and shaded areas),
model with high bank capital channel (blue dotted lines with circle), model without imperfect interest rate pass-through (green
dotted lines), model with pre-determined lending rates (red dashed lines with cross).74
ECB












































































































































































































































































































Fig. 8: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on εP
t . Benchmark model (plain lines and shaded areas),
model with high bank capital channel (blue dotted lines with circle), model without imperfect interest rate pass-through (green
dotted lines), model with pre-determined lending rates (red dashed lines with cross).75
ECB











































































































































































































































































































Fig. 9: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on εR
D,t. Benchmark model (plain lines and shaded
areas), model with high bank capital channel (blue dotted lines with circle), model without imperfect interest rate pass-through
(green dotted lines), model with pre-determined lending rates (red dashed lines with cross).76
ECB







































































































































































































































































































Fig. 10: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on εR
HH,t. Benchmark model (plain lines and shaded
areas), model with high bank capital channel (blue dotted lines with circle), model without imperfect interest rate pass-through
(green dotted lines), model with pre-determined lending rates (red dashed lines with cross).77
ECB




















































































































































































































































































Fig. 11: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on εR
E,t. Benchmark model (plain lines and shaded
areas), model with high bank capital channel (blue dotted lines with circle), model without imperfect interest rate pass-through
(green dotted lines), model with pre-determined lending rates (red dashed lines with cross).78
ECB















































































































































































































































































































Fig. 12: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on εσ
HH,t. Benchmark model (plain lines and shaded
areas), model with high bank capital channel (blue dotted lines with circle), model without imperfect interest rate pass-through
(green dotted lines), model with pre-determined lending rates (red dashed lines with cross).79
ECB
















































































































































































































































































Fig. 13: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on εσ
E,t. Benchmark model (plain lines and shaded
areas), model with high bank capital channel (blue dotted lines with circle), model without imperfect interest rate pass-through
(green dotted lines), model with pre-determined lending rates (red dashed lines with cross).80
ECB

























































































































































































































































































Fig. 14: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on ε
Bankcap
t . Benchmark model (plain lines and
shaded areas), model with high bank capital channel (blue dotted lines with circle), model without imperfect interest rate pass-
through (green dotted lines), model with pre-determined lending rates (red dashed lines with cross).81
ECB














































































































































































































































































Fig. 15: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on εR
t . Benchmark model (plain lines and shaded
areas), model with high bank capital channel (blue dotted lines with circle), model without imperfect interest rate pass-through
(green dotted lines), model with pre-determined lending rates (red dashed lines with cross).82
ECB






























































































































































































































































































Fig. 16: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on εD
t . Without nominal and real rigidities in the
housing sector: benchmark (black plain lines), pre-determined lending rates (red dotted lines), binding collateral constraint
(blue dashed lines).83
ECB





































































































































































































































































































Fig. 17: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on εσ
HH,t. Without nominal and real rigidities in
the housing sector: benchmark (black plain lines), pre-determined lending rates (red dotted lines), binding collateral constraint
(blue dashed lines).84
ECB
















































































































































































































































































Fig. 18: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on εσ
E,t. Without nominal and real rigidities in the
housing sector: benchmark (black plain lines), pre-determined lending rates (red dotted lines), binding collateral constraint
(blue dashed lines).85
ECB





























































































































































































































































































Fig. 19: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on εD
t . Withnominal and real rigidities in the housing
sector: benchmark (black plain lines), pre-determined lending rates (red dotted lines), bindingcollateral constraint (blue dashed
lines).86
ECB










































































































































































































































































































Fig. 20: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on εD
t . benchmark (black plain lines), pre-determined
lendingrates (red dotted lines), benchmark Basle II (blue dashed lines), pre-determined lendingrates Basle II (green cross lines).87
ECB







































































































































































































































































































Fig. 21: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on εσ
HH,t. benchmark (black plain lines), pre-
determined lending rates (red dotted lines), benchmark Basle II (blue dashed lines), pre-determined lending rates Basle II
(green cross lines).88
ECB


























































































































































































































































































Fig.22: Impulse Response Functions associatedtoa shock on εσ
E,t. benchmark(blackplainlines),pre-determined
lendingrates (red dotted lines), benchmark Basle II (blue dashed lines), pre-determined lendingrates Basle II (green cross lines).89
ECB



























































































































































































































































































Fig. 23: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on ε
Bankcap
t . benchmark (black plain lines), pre-
determined lending rates (red dotted lines), benchmark Basle II (blue dashed lines), pre-determined lending rates Basle II (green
cross lines).90
ECB






















































































































































































































































































Fig. 24: Impulse Response Functions associated to a shock on εR
t . benchmark (black plain lines), pre-determined
lendingrates (red dotted lines), benchmark Basle II (blue dashed lines), pre-determined lendingrates Basle II (green cross lines).91
ECB
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Fig. 26: TRANSITIONAL DYNAMICS TO HIGHER CAPITAL REQUIREMENT FOR DIFFERENT IMPLEMENTA-
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Fig. 27: TRANSITIONAL DYNAMICS TO HIGHER CAPITAL REQUIREMENT FOR DIFFERENT IMPLEMENTA-
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Regulatory regime Basel I Basel I Basel I Basel II Counter-cyclical Counter-cyclical
all shocks bench.
Optimized policy parameters
ρ 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.93 0.997 0.96
rπ 43.90 43.90 52.06 52.07 43.91 43.91
rΔπ 0.53 0.75 1.12 1.13 -0.43 0.43
ry 0.57 0.75 0.04 0.07 0.92 0.93
rΔy 0.56 1.74 2.30 2.24 1.61 1.99
rTD 0.20 0.68 0.41 0.63 0.00 0.26
rΔh - - 0.45 0.63 0.00 0.36
rQ - - 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00
rΔe - - -0.08 -0.12 0.00 0.02
ρ
bc - - - - 0.78 0.77
r
bc
y - - - - 113.00 0.00
r
bc
Δy - - - - 0.40 0.00
r
bc
TD - - - - 0.03 0.13
r
bc
Δh - - - - -0.05 0.01
r
bc
Q - - - - -1.91 -0.38
r
bc
Δe - - - - -0.43 -0.11
Relative STD to bench. (in %)
ΔZt - 100.0 80.3 102.3 16.5 78.6
Πt - 100.0 139.8 116.7 71.6 138.2
Rt - 100.0 72.0 91.9 29.7 65.1
TD,t - 100.0 100.0 96.1 104.6 100.6
BHH,t - 100.0 97.0 84.7 227.8 103.2
BE,t - 100.0 99.9 80.4 136.8 94.4
Leveraget - 100.0 99.0 230.1 482.4 94.6
L - 0.34 0.23 0.40 0.03 0.32Working PaPer SerieS
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